Cristina Lafont sobre la completitud de la razón pública

Cristina Lafont sobre la completitud de la razón pública

En este trabajo se analiza un aspecto ortogonal de Lafont (2020): su rechazo de la tesis rawlsiana de la completitud de la razón pública. Con tal fin, se presenta sucintamente dicha doctrina y el debate que ha generado. Se introduce la posición de Lafont: la razón pública no es suficiente en algunos casos difíciles; aunque ello no significa que debamos acudir a las concepciones comprehensivas, debemos buscar algún tipo de acomodo institucional. Aquí, en cambio, se arguye a favor de la completitud de la razón pública y se presenta una objeción a la posición de Lafont.

Guardado en:

Revista Derecho del Estado

0122-9893

2346-2051

Moreso, J. J.

UNIVERSIDAD EXTERNADO DE COLOMBIA

10.18601/01229893.n55.03

2023-03-22

15

31

Colombia

Cristina Lafont,

John Rawls,

razón pública,

completitud,

el hecho del pluralismo

http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2

info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0.

J. J. Moreso - 2023

id db02c5f2655db18ec459d420d955ebe0
record_format ojs
spelling Cristina Lafont sobre la completitud de la razón pública
Lafont, C. Democracy without Shortcuts. A Participatory Conception of Deliberative Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020.
Rawls, J. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.
Rawls, J. An Interview with John Rawls. En Commonweal. 25 de septiembre, 1998. Disponible en: https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/interview-john-rawls
Quong, J. Public Reason. En The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Summer 2022 Edition. Zalta, E. N. (ed.). De próxima publicación en: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2022/entries/public-reason/
Parfit, D. On what Matters. Vol. 3. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
Parfit, D. On what Matters. Vols. 1 y 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Moreso, J. J. y Valentini, C. In the Region of Middle Axioms: Judicial Dialogue as Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Mid-Level Principles. En Law and Philosophy. Vol. 40, n.º 5, 2021, 545-583.
Moreso, J. J. Rawls, el derecho y el hecho del pluralismo. En Anales de la Cátedra Francisco Suárez. Vol. 55, 2021, 49-74.
MacIntyre, A. Doctrine of Double Effect. En The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Spring 2019 Edition. Zalta, E. N. (ed.). De próxima publicación en: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/double-effect/
Kant, I. Metafísica de las costumbres (1797). A. Cortina y J. Conill (trad.). Madrid: Tecnos, 1989.
Raz, J. The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.
Kamm, F. M. Theory and Analogy in Law. En Arizona State Law Journal. Vol. 29, 1997, 405-426.
Kamm, F. M. Creation and Abortion: A Study in Moral and Legal Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
Henley, K. Abstract Principles, Mid-Level Principles, and the Rule of Law. En Law and Philosophy. Vol. 12, 1993, 121-132.
Hart, H. L. A. Punishment and Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968.
Gödel, K. Obras completas. J. Mosterín (trad.). Madrid: Alianza, 1981.
Gaus, G. The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
Gaus, G. Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay on Epistemology and Political Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
Freeman, S. Justice and the Social Contract: Essays in Rawlsian Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
Foot, P. The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect. En Oxford Review. Vol. 5, 1967, 1-7.
Rawls, J. The Idea of Public Reason Revisited. En The University of Chicago Law Review. Vol. 64, n.º 3, 1997.
Reidy, D. Public Political Reason. En Mandle, J. y Roberts-Cady, S. (eds.), John Rawls: Debating the Major Questions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020, 21-34.
Dworkin, R. Life’s Dominion. An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom. London: Harper Collins, 1993.
Williams, A. The Alleged Incompleteness of Public Reason. En Res Publica. Vol. 6, n.º 2, 2000, 199-211.
Text
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/ARTREF
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Thomson, J. J. A Defense of Abortion. En Philosophy & Public Affairs. Vol. 7, n.º 1, 1971, 47-66.
Reidy, D. Rawls’s Wide View of Public Reason: Not Wide Enough. En Res Publica. Vol. 6, n.º 1, 2000, 49-72.
Sunstein, C. Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
Sunstein, C. Incompletely Theorized Agreements. En Harvard Law Review. Vol. 108, 1995, 1733-1772.
Sunstein, C. From Theory to Practice. En Arizona State Law Journal. Vol. 29, 1997, 389-404.
Sidgwick, H. Practical Ethics. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co, 1909.
Shiffrin, S. V. Speech, Death, and the Fair Equality of Opportunity Principle. En New York University Law Review. Vol. 78, 2003, 1135-1185.
Schwartzman, M. The Completeness of Public Reason. En Politics, Philosophy, & Economics. Vol. 3, n.º 2, 2004, 191-220.
Sandel, M. Public Philosophy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005.
Ross, D. The Right and the Good. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930.
Ross, D. The Foundations of Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939.
Finnis, J. The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion: A Reply to Judith Thomson. En Philosophy and Public Affairs. Vol. 2, 1973, 117-145.
Dworkin, R.; Nagel, T. y Nozick, R. Assited Suicide: The Philosopher”s Brief. En New York Review of Books. 27 de marzo, 1997.
Dworkin, R. Keynote Address: Rawls and the Law. En Fordham Law Review. Vol. 72, 2004, 1387-1405 (ahora en Dworkin, R. Justice in Robes. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006, cap. 9).
https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/derest/article/view/8589
En este trabajo se analiza un aspecto ortogonal de Lafont (2020): su rechazo de la tesis rawlsiana de la completitud de la razón pública. Con tal fin, se presenta sucintamente dicha doctrina y el debate que ha generado. Se introduce la posición de Lafont: la razón pública no es suficiente en algunos casos difíciles; aunque ello no significa que debamos acudir a las concepciones comprehensivas, debemos buscar algún tipo de acomodo institucional. Aquí, en cambio, se arguye a favor de la completitud de la razón pública y se presenta una objeción a la posición de Lafont.
Moreso, J. J.
Cristina Lafont,
John Rawls,
razón pública,
completitud,
el hecho del pluralismo
55
Núm. 55 , Año 2023 : Edición Especial
Artículo de revista
text/html
text/xml
Departamento de Derecho Constitucional
Revista Derecho del Estado
application/pdf
Publication
Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0.
Dworkin, R. Justice in Robes. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006.
Dworkin, R. In Praise of Theory. En Arizona State Law Journal. Vol. 27, 1997, 353-376 (ahora en Dworkin, R. Justice in Robes. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006, cap. 2).
Chang, R. Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997.
Beauchamp, T. L. y Childress, J. F. Principles of Biomedical Ethics. 7.ª ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
Beauchamp, T. L. y Childress, J. F. Principles of Biomedical Ethics. 4.ª ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.
Audi, R. The Good and the Right. A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004.
Bayles, M. D. Mid-Level Principles and Justification. En Nomos: Am. Soc’y Pol. Legal Phil. Vol. 28, n.º 49, 1986, 49-67.
J. J. Moreso - 2023
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0
Español
the fact of pluralism
Journal article
In this paper, an orthogonal aspect of Lafont (2020) is analysed: her rejection of the Rawlsian thesis of completeness of public reason. For that purpose, such doctrine is succinctly presented and the generated debate too. Lafont’s account is introduced: public reason is not sufficient in some hard cases, but this insufficiency does not mean that we should resort to the comprehensive conceptions, we should looking for some kind of policy of accommodation. In the paper, instead, it is argued in favour of the completeness of public reason and an objection to the Lafont’s account is introduced.
Cristina Lafont on the Completeness of Public Reason
Cristina Lafont,
John Rawls,
public reason,
completeness,
2023-03-22T10:51:03Z
0122-9893
https://doi.org/10.18601/01229893.n55.03
https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/derest/article/download/8589/13957
https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/derest/article/download/8589/13981
https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/derest/article/download/8589/13958
2023-03-22T10:51:03Z
2346-2051
31
15
2023-03-22
10.18601/01229893.n55.03
institution UNIVERSIDAD EXTERNADO DE COLOMBIA
thumbnail https://nuevo.metarevistas.org/UNIVERSIDADEXTERNADODECOLOMBIA/logo.png
country_str Colombia
collection Revista Derecho del Estado
title Cristina Lafont sobre la completitud de la razón pública
spellingShingle Cristina Lafont sobre la completitud de la razón pública
Moreso, J. J.
Cristina Lafont,
John Rawls,
razón pública,
completitud,
el hecho del pluralismo
the fact of pluralism
Cristina Lafont,
John Rawls,
public reason,
completeness,
title_short Cristina Lafont sobre la completitud de la razón pública
title_full Cristina Lafont sobre la completitud de la razón pública
title_fullStr Cristina Lafont sobre la completitud de la razón pública
title_full_unstemmed Cristina Lafont sobre la completitud de la razón pública
title_sort cristina lafont sobre la completitud de la razón pública
title_eng Cristina Lafont on the Completeness of Public Reason
description En este trabajo se analiza un aspecto ortogonal de Lafont (2020): su rechazo de la tesis rawlsiana de la completitud de la razón pública. Con tal fin, se presenta sucintamente dicha doctrina y el debate que ha generado. Se introduce la posición de Lafont: la razón pública no es suficiente en algunos casos difíciles; aunque ello no significa que debamos acudir a las concepciones comprehensivas, debemos buscar algún tipo de acomodo institucional. Aquí, en cambio, se arguye a favor de la completitud de la razón pública y se presenta una objeción a la posición de Lafont.
description_eng In this paper, an orthogonal aspect of Lafont (2020) is analysed: her rejection of the Rawlsian thesis of completeness of public reason. For that purpose, such doctrine is succinctly presented and the generated debate too. Lafont’s account is introduced: public reason is not sufficient in some hard cases, but this insufficiency does not mean that we should resort to the comprehensive conceptions, we should looking for some kind of policy of accommodation. In the paper, instead, it is argued in favour of the completeness of public reason and an objection to the Lafont’s account is introduced.
author Moreso, J. J.
author_facet Moreso, J. J.
topicspa_str_mv Cristina Lafont,
John Rawls,
razón pública,
completitud,
el hecho del pluralismo
topic Cristina Lafont,
John Rawls,
razón pública,
completitud,
el hecho del pluralismo
the fact of pluralism
Cristina Lafont,
John Rawls,
public reason,
completeness,
topic_facet Cristina Lafont,
John Rawls,
razón pública,
completitud,
el hecho del pluralismo
the fact of pluralism
Cristina Lafont,
John Rawls,
public reason,
completeness,
citationissue 55
citationedition Núm. 55 , Año 2023 : Edición Especial
publisher Departamento de Derecho Constitucional
ispartofjournal Revista Derecho del Estado
source https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/derest/article/view/8589
language Español
format Article
rights http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0.
J. J. Moreso - 2023
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0
references Lafont, C. Democracy without Shortcuts. A Participatory Conception of Deliberative Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020.
Rawls, J. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.
Rawls, J. An Interview with John Rawls. En Commonweal. 25 de septiembre, 1998. Disponible en: https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/interview-john-rawls
Quong, J. Public Reason. En The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Summer 2022 Edition. Zalta, E. N. (ed.). De próxima publicación en: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2022/entries/public-reason/
Parfit, D. On what Matters. Vol. 3. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
Parfit, D. On what Matters. Vols. 1 y 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Moreso, J. J. y Valentini, C. In the Region of Middle Axioms: Judicial Dialogue as Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Mid-Level Principles. En Law and Philosophy. Vol. 40, n.º 5, 2021, 545-583.
Moreso, J. J. Rawls, el derecho y el hecho del pluralismo. En Anales de la Cátedra Francisco Suárez. Vol. 55, 2021, 49-74.
MacIntyre, A. Doctrine of Double Effect. En The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Spring 2019 Edition. Zalta, E. N. (ed.). De próxima publicación en: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/double-effect/
Kant, I. Metafísica de las costumbres (1797). A. Cortina y J. Conill (trad.). Madrid: Tecnos, 1989.
Raz, J. The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.
Kamm, F. M. Theory and Analogy in Law. En Arizona State Law Journal. Vol. 29, 1997, 405-426.
Kamm, F. M. Creation and Abortion: A Study in Moral and Legal Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
Henley, K. Abstract Principles, Mid-Level Principles, and the Rule of Law. En Law and Philosophy. Vol. 12, 1993, 121-132.
Hart, H. L. A. Punishment and Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968.
Gödel, K. Obras completas. J. Mosterín (trad.). Madrid: Alianza, 1981.
Gaus, G. The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
Gaus, G. Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay on Epistemology and Political Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
Freeman, S. Justice and the Social Contract: Essays in Rawlsian Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
Foot, P. The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect. En Oxford Review. Vol. 5, 1967, 1-7.
Rawls, J. The Idea of Public Reason Revisited. En The University of Chicago Law Review. Vol. 64, n.º 3, 1997.
Reidy, D. Public Political Reason. En Mandle, J. y Roberts-Cady, S. (eds.), John Rawls: Debating the Major Questions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020, 21-34.
Dworkin, R. Life’s Dominion. An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom. London: Harper Collins, 1993.
Williams, A. The Alleged Incompleteness of Public Reason. En Res Publica. Vol. 6, n.º 2, 2000, 199-211.
Thomson, J. J. A Defense of Abortion. En Philosophy & Public Affairs. Vol. 7, n.º 1, 1971, 47-66.
Reidy, D. Rawls’s Wide View of Public Reason: Not Wide Enough. En Res Publica. Vol. 6, n.º 1, 2000, 49-72.
Sunstein, C. Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
Sunstein, C. Incompletely Theorized Agreements. En Harvard Law Review. Vol. 108, 1995, 1733-1772.
Sunstein, C. From Theory to Practice. En Arizona State Law Journal. Vol. 29, 1997, 389-404.
Sidgwick, H. Practical Ethics. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co, 1909.
Shiffrin, S. V. Speech, Death, and the Fair Equality of Opportunity Principle. En New York University Law Review. Vol. 78, 2003, 1135-1185.
Schwartzman, M. The Completeness of Public Reason. En Politics, Philosophy, & Economics. Vol. 3, n.º 2, 2004, 191-220.
Sandel, M. Public Philosophy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005.
Ross, D. The Right and the Good. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930.
Ross, D. The Foundations of Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939.
Finnis, J. The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion: A Reply to Judith Thomson. En Philosophy and Public Affairs. Vol. 2, 1973, 117-145.
Dworkin, R.; Nagel, T. y Nozick, R. Assited Suicide: The Philosopher”s Brief. En New York Review of Books. 27 de marzo, 1997.
Dworkin, R. Keynote Address: Rawls and the Law. En Fordham Law Review. Vol. 72, 2004, 1387-1405 (ahora en Dworkin, R. Justice in Robes. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006, cap. 9).
Dworkin, R. Justice in Robes. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006.
Dworkin, R. In Praise of Theory. En Arizona State Law Journal. Vol. 27, 1997, 353-376 (ahora en Dworkin, R. Justice in Robes. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006, cap. 2).
Chang, R. Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997.
Beauchamp, T. L. y Childress, J. F. Principles of Biomedical Ethics. 7.ª ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
Beauchamp, T. L. y Childress, J. F. Principles of Biomedical Ethics. 4.ª ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.
Audi, R. The Good and the Right. A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004.
Bayles, M. D. Mid-Level Principles and Justification. En Nomos: Am. Soc’y Pol. Legal Phil. Vol. 28, n.º 49, 1986, 49-67.
type_driver info:eu-repo/semantics/article
type_coar http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
type_version info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
type_coarversion http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
type_content Text
publishDate 2023-03-22
date_accessioned 2023-03-22T10:51:03Z
date_available 2023-03-22T10:51:03Z
url https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/derest/article/view/8589
url_doi https://doi.org/10.18601/01229893.n55.03
issn 0122-9893
eissn 2346-2051
doi 10.18601/01229893.n55.03
citationstartpage 15
citationendpage 31
url2_str_mv https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/derest/article/download/8589/13957
url4_str_mv https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/derest/article/download/8589/13981
url3_str_mv https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/derest/article/download/8589/13958
_version_ 1797158296338038784

Código QR

Estadísticas y Métricas Alternativas

Títulos similares