Repensar la eficacia de las políticas y medidas de protección del consumidor en el mercado financiero

Repensar la eficacia de las políticas y medidas de protección del consumidor en el mercado financiero

Este documento identifica y desafía la práctica frecuente de las instituciones financieras en el diseño y venta de productos financieros complejos a consumidores que no pueden comprender completamente y, por lo tanto, no pueden tomar decisiones informadas antes de consumir dichos productos financieros. Engañar a los consumidores para que compren inadvertidamente productos financieros complejos, hace que muchos de ellos sufran pérdidas financieras, y esta situación, en conjunto, tiene muchos efectos negativos en la sociedad. El documento analiza además por qué las instituciones financieras están motivadas para producir y vender con éxito productos financieros complejos; florecen, principalmente porque, se aprovechan de los sistemas regulator... Ver más

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1794-2918

2590-8928

Iheme, Williams C.

UNIVERSIDAD DE CALDAS

10.17151/jurid.2022.19.2.9

19

2022-07-01

165

185

Colombia

Mercado financiero

Protección al consumidor

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spelling Repensar la eficacia de las políticas y medidas de protección del consumidor en el mercado financiero
Jurídicas
Artículo de revista
Núm. 2 , Año 2022 : Julio - Diciembre
2
19
Mercado financiero
Protección al consumidor
Iheme, Williams C.
Este documento identifica y desafía la práctica frecuente de las instituciones financieras en el diseño y venta de productos financieros complejos a consumidores que no pueden comprender completamente y, por lo tanto, no pueden tomar decisiones informadas antes de consumir dichos productos financieros. Engañar a los consumidores para que compren inadvertidamente productos financieros complejos, hace que muchos de ellos sufran pérdidas financieras, y esta situación, en conjunto, tiene muchos efectos negativos en la sociedad. El documento analiza además por qué las instituciones financieras están motivadas para producir y vender con éxito productos financieros complejos; florecen, principalmente porque, se aprovechan de los sistemas regulatorios inadecuados, entre otras cosas. Del mismo modo, el entorno propicio creado por la ley de contratos, que exalta los principios de Pacta Sunt Servanda y Caveat Emptor, hace que el abuso de los consumidores financieros no sea completamente perceptible y apreciado por los reguladores, y deja que los primeros se enderecen en gran medida por sus propios medios. El documento señala las debilidades en las medidas de política contra la explotación del consumidor; las reglas de divulgación destrozadas que imponen a los consumidores la carga de la comprensión de productos financieros complejos a pesar de la forma en que se manipulan estas reglas de divulgación para disminuir la posibilidad de que los consumidores comprendan por completo los productos financieros; y el hecho de que la mayoría de los folletos de información financiera están salpicados en gran medida de terminologías financieras y se presentan en un lenguaje complicado sin dejar de satisfacer el requisito legal de divulgación. El documento propone una nueva forma de regla de divulgación basada en los conceptos de proveedor de advertencia y contra proferentem, que respectivamente deben requerir la presentación de información por parte de las instituciones financieras contra el interés propio, y la presentación inequívoca del mismo número de desventajas junto con las ventajas de productos que ofrecen a los consumidores. Además, la función principal de los reguladores y los tribunales en esta circunstancia debe ser supervisar y evaluar el nivel de cumplimiento y, en consecuencia, emitir un certificado de calificación anual de desempeño que todas las instituciones financieras deben publicar de manera notable en sus lugares de negocios y también incorporarlo en los folletos informativos en los que describen sus productos, para que los consumidores puedan conocer de un vistazo aquellas instituciones financieras que son o no tan amigables para el consumidor.
Universidad de Caldas
Nilsson J., Nordvall A.C., Isberg, S. (2016). The Information Search Process of Socially Responsible Investors. In T. Harrison (ed.), Financial Literacy and the Limits of Financial Decision-Making. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.
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O’Donoghue, T., & Rabin, M. (1999). Doing it now or later. American Economic Review, 89(1), 103-124. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.89.1.103
Nalebuff, B. (2002). The Strategy of Bundling. In M. Goldsmith, V. Govindarajan, V. Kaye, B. Vicere (eds.). The Many Facets of Leadership (pp.293-301), Prentice Hall.
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Poulain, M. (2017) Regulatory Capture in Financial Supervision. In R. Douady, C. Goulet, P.C. Pradier (eds.), Financial Regulation in the EU. (pp. 107-122) Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.
Mann, R. J. (2012). After the Great Recession: Regulating financial services for low-and middle-income communities. Wash. & Lee L. Rev., 69, 729-750.
Lusardi, A., & Mitchell, O. S. (2014). The economic importance of financial literacy: Theory and evidence. Journal of economic literature, 52(1), 5-44. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.52.1.5
Ko, K.J. & Williams, J. (2013). The Effects of Regulating Penalty Fees for Consumer Financial Products. https://www.fdic.gov/analysis/cfr/consumer/2012/the-effects-of-regulating-penalty-fees-for-consumer-financial-products.pdf
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Lacko, J. M., & Pappalardo, J. K. (2010). The failure and promise of mandated consumer mortgage disclosures: Evidence from qualitative interviews and a controlled experiment with mortgage borrowers. American Economic Review, 100(2), 516-521. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.2.516
Ko, K. J., & Williams, J. (2017). The Effects of Regulating Hidden Add‐On Costs. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 49(1), 39-74. https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.12368
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Klemperer, P. (1987). Markets with Consumer Switching Costs. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,102(2), 375-394. https://doi.org/10.2307/1885068
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Iyengar, S. S., & Lepper, M. R. (2000). When choice is demotivating: Can one desire too much of a good thing? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79(6), 995–1006. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.79.6.995
Iheme, W. C. (2020). Vulnerability, Financial Inclusion, and the Heightened Relevance of Education in a Credit Crisis. In C. G. Stanescu & A. A. Gikay (eds.), Discrimination, Vulnerable Consumers and Financial Inclusion (pp. 80-110). Routledge.
Pak, K. & Shadel, D. (2011). AARP Foundation National Fraud Victim Study. AARP Research and Strategic Analysis.
Tajti, T. (2019). Unprotected consumers in the digital age: The consumer-creditors of bankrupt, abandoned, defunct and of zombie companies. Tilburg Law Review, 24(1), 3-26. https://doi.org/10.5334/tilr.139
Schwartz, L. M. (1997). The role of numeracy in understanding the benefit of screening mammography. Annals of Internal Medicine, 127(11), 966. https://doi.org/10.7326/0003-4819-127-11-199712010-00003
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Bar-Gill, O. (2006). Bundling and consumer misperception. The University of Chicago Law Review, 73(1), 33-61. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4495543
This paper aims to identify and challenge the common practice among financial institutions of designing and selling complex financial products to consumers who lack full comprehension, thus preventing them from making informed decisions before consuming such financial products. This deceptive approach leads many consumers to experience financial losses, with significant negative consequences for society as a whole. The paper delves into the motivations behind financial institutions to produce and successfully sell complex financial products; they flourish, mainly because they often take advantage of the inadequate regulatory systems, amongst other things. Furthermore, it explores the enabling environment created by laissez-faire contract, which prioritizes principles like pacta sunt servanda and caveat emptor, resulting in regulators overlooking and undervaluing the abuse faced by financial consumers, leaving them largely responsible for resolving their own challenges. The paper exposes the shortcoming of policy measures aimed at preventing consumer exploitation, including the flawed disclosure rules that place the burden of comprehension on consumers while being manipulated to undermine their full understanding. Additionally, it critiques the use of complicated language and heavy use of financial jargon in financial information booklets, which, although meeting legal disclosure requirements, hinder the comprehension of consumers. To address these issues, the paper proposes a new disclosure rule grounded in the concepts of caveat venditor and contra proferentem. This rule would require financial institutions to present information against their own self-interest and provide an equal number of disadvantages alongside advantages for the products they offer. Furthermore, it suggests that regulators and courts should play a pivotal role in supervising and assessing compliance, issuing annual performance-rated certificates that financial institutions must prominently display in their establishments and incorporate into their product information leaflets. This approach would allow consumers to easily identify consumer-friendly financial institutions
Consumer protection
Financial marketplace
Journal article
application/pdf
https://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/juridicas/article/view/8322
Inglés
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Albino, D., Hu, A., & Bar-Yam, Y. (2013). Corporations and regulators, the game of influence in regulatory capture. Working Paper, pp.5-7. https://arxiv.org/pdf/1310.0057.pdf
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Rethinking the Effectiveness of Consumer Protection Policies and Measures in the Financial Marketplace
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Publication
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https://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/juridicas/article/download/8322/6935
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2022-07-01
2022-07-01T00:00:00Z
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10.17151/jurid.2022.19.2.9
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institution UNIVERSIDAD DE CALDAS
thumbnail https://nuevo.metarevistas.org/UNIVERSIDADDECALDAS/logo.png
country_str Colombia
collection Jurídicas
title Repensar la eficacia de las políticas y medidas de protección del consumidor en el mercado financiero
spellingShingle Repensar la eficacia de las políticas y medidas de protección del consumidor en el mercado financiero
Iheme, Williams C.
Mercado financiero
Protección al consumidor
Consumer protection
Financial marketplace
title_short Repensar la eficacia de las políticas y medidas de protección del consumidor en el mercado financiero
title_full Repensar la eficacia de las políticas y medidas de protección del consumidor en el mercado financiero
title_fullStr Repensar la eficacia de las políticas y medidas de protección del consumidor en el mercado financiero
title_full_unstemmed Repensar la eficacia de las políticas y medidas de protección del consumidor en el mercado financiero
title_sort repensar la eficacia de las políticas y medidas de protección del consumidor en el mercado financiero
title_eng Rethinking the Effectiveness of Consumer Protection Policies and Measures in the Financial Marketplace
description Este documento identifica y desafía la práctica frecuente de las instituciones financieras en el diseño y venta de productos financieros complejos a consumidores que no pueden comprender completamente y, por lo tanto, no pueden tomar decisiones informadas antes de consumir dichos productos financieros. Engañar a los consumidores para que compren inadvertidamente productos financieros complejos, hace que muchos de ellos sufran pérdidas financieras, y esta situación, en conjunto, tiene muchos efectos negativos en la sociedad. El documento analiza además por qué las instituciones financieras están motivadas para producir y vender con éxito productos financieros complejos; florecen, principalmente porque, se aprovechan de los sistemas regulatorios inadecuados, entre otras cosas. Del mismo modo, el entorno propicio creado por la ley de contratos, que exalta los principios de Pacta Sunt Servanda y Caveat Emptor, hace que el abuso de los consumidores financieros no sea completamente perceptible y apreciado por los reguladores, y deja que los primeros se enderecen en gran medida por sus propios medios. El documento señala las debilidades en las medidas de política contra la explotación del consumidor; las reglas de divulgación destrozadas que imponen a los consumidores la carga de la comprensión de productos financieros complejos a pesar de la forma en que se manipulan estas reglas de divulgación para disminuir la posibilidad de que los consumidores comprendan por completo los productos financieros; y el hecho de que la mayoría de los folletos de información financiera están salpicados en gran medida de terminologías financieras y se presentan en un lenguaje complicado sin dejar de satisfacer el requisito legal de divulgación. El documento propone una nueva forma de regla de divulgación basada en los conceptos de proveedor de advertencia y contra proferentem, que respectivamente deben requerir la presentación de información por parte de las instituciones financieras contra el interés propio, y la presentación inequívoca del mismo número de desventajas junto con las ventajas de productos que ofrecen a los consumidores. Además, la función principal de los reguladores y los tribunales en esta circunstancia debe ser supervisar y evaluar el nivel de cumplimiento y, en consecuencia, emitir un certificado de calificación anual de desempeño que todas las instituciones financieras deben publicar de manera notable en sus lugares de negocios y también incorporarlo en los folletos informativos en los que describen sus productos, para que los consumidores puedan conocer de un vistazo aquellas instituciones financieras que son o no tan amigables para el consumidor.
description_eng This paper aims to identify and challenge the common practice among financial institutions of designing and selling complex financial products to consumers who lack full comprehension, thus preventing them from making informed decisions before consuming such financial products. This deceptive approach leads many consumers to experience financial losses, with significant negative consequences for society as a whole. The paper delves into the motivations behind financial institutions to produce and successfully sell complex financial products; they flourish, mainly because they often take advantage of the inadequate regulatory systems, amongst other things. Furthermore, it explores the enabling environment created by laissez-faire contract, which prioritizes principles like pacta sunt servanda and caveat emptor, resulting in regulators overlooking and undervaluing the abuse faced by financial consumers, leaving them largely responsible for resolving their own challenges. The paper exposes the shortcoming of policy measures aimed at preventing consumer exploitation, including the flawed disclosure rules that place the burden of comprehension on consumers while being manipulated to undermine their full understanding. Additionally, it critiques the use of complicated language and heavy use of financial jargon in financial information booklets, which, although meeting legal disclosure requirements, hinder the comprehension of consumers. To address these issues, the paper proposes a new disclosure rule grounded in the concepts of caveat venditor and contra proferentem. This rule would require financial institutions to present information against their own self-interest and provide an equal number of disadvantages alongside advantages for the products they offer. Furthermore, it suggests that regulators and courts should play a pivotal role in supervising and assessing compliance, issuing annual performance-rated certificates that financial institutions must prominently display in their establishments and incorporate into their product information leaflets. This approach would allow consumers to easily identify consumer-friendly financial institutions
author Iheme, Williams C.
author_facet Iheme, Williams C.
topicspa_str_mv Mercado financiero
Protección al consumidor
topic Mercado financiero
Protección al consumidor
Consumer protection
Financial marketplace
topic_facet Mercado financiero
Protección al consumidor
Consumer protection
Financial marketplace
citationvolume 19
citationissue 2
citationedition Núm. 2 , Año 2022 : Julio - Diciembre
publisher Universidad de Caldas
ispartofjournal Jurídicas
source https://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/juridicas/article/view/8322
language Inglés
format Article
rights http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
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references_eng Nilsson J., Nordvall A.C., Isberg, S. (2016). The Information Search Process of Socially Responsible Investors. In T. Harrison (ed.), Financial Literacy and the Limits of Financial Decision-Making. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.
Nalebuff, B., & Majerus, D. (2003). Bundling, tying, and portfolio effects: Part 2: Case studies. DTI.
O’Donoghue, T., & Rabin, M. (1999). Doing it now or later. American Economic Review, 89(1), 103-124. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.89.1.103
Nalebuff, B. (2002). The Strategy of Bundling. In M. Goldsmith, V. Govindarajan, V. Kaye, B. Vicere (eds.). The Many Facets of Leadership (pp.293-301), Prentice Hall.
Melecky, M & Rutledge, S. (2016). Financial Consumer Protection and the Global Financial Crisis. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.913.2243&rep=rep1&type=pdf
Poulain, M. (2017) Regulatory Capture in Financial Supervision. In R. Douady, C. Goulet, P.C. Pradier (eds.), Financial Regulation in the EU. (pp. 107-122) Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.
Mann, R. J. (2012). After the Great Recession: Regulating financial services for low-and middle-income communities. Wash. & Lee L. Rev., 69, 729-750.
Lusardi, A., & Mitchell, O. S. (2014). The economic importance of financial literacy: Theory and evidence. Journal of economic literature, 52(1), 5-44. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.52.1.5
Ko, K.J. & Williams, J. (2013). The Effects of Regulating Penalty Fees for Consumer Financial Products. https://www.fdic.gov/analysis/cfr/consumer/2012/the-effects-of-regulating-penalty-fees-for-consumer-financial-products.pdf
Lusardi, A., & Mitchelli, O. S. (2007). Financial literacy and retirement preparedness: Evidence and implications for financial education. Business economics, 42(1), 35-44. http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25516
Lacko, J. M., & Pappalardo, J. K. (2010). The failure and promise of mandated consumer mortgage disclosures: Evidence from qualitative interviews and a controlled experiment with mortgage borrowers. American Economic Review, 100(2), 516-521. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.2.516
Ko, K. J., & Williams, J. (2017). The Effects of Regulating Hidden Add‐On Costs. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 49(1), 39-74. https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.12368
Schwartz, A., Grether, D.M. & Louis, L.W. (1986). Irrelevance of Information Overload: An Analysis of Search and Disclosure. 59 Southern California Law Review, 59(277), 277-303. https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2099&context=fss_papers
Klemperer, P. (1987). Markets with Consumer Switching Costs. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,102(2), 375-394. https://doi.org/10.2307/1885068
Kiser, E. K. (2002). Household switching behavior at depository institutions: Evidence from survey data. The Antitrust Bulletin, 47(4), 619-640. https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X0204700404
Jager, C. E. de. (2017). A Question of Trust: the Pursuit of Consumer Trust in the Financial Sector by Means of EU Legislation. Journal of Consumer Policy, 40(1), 25-49. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10603-016-9334-8
Iyengar, S. S., & Lepper, M. R. (2000). When choice is demotivating: Can one desire too much of a good thing? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79(6), 995–1006. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.79.6.995
Iheme, W. C. (2020). Vulnerability, Financial Inclusion, and the Heightened Relevance of Education in a Credit Crisis. In C. G. Stanescu & A. A. Gikay (eds.), Discrimination, Vulnerable Consumers and Financial Inclusion (pp. 80-110). Routledge.
Pak, K. & Shadel, D. (2011). AARP Foundation National Fraud Victim Study. AARP Research and Strategic Analysis.
Tajti, T. (2019). Unprotected consumers in the digital age: The consumer-creditors of bankrupt, abandoned, defunct and of zombie companies. Tilburg Law Review, 24(1), 3-26. https://doi.org/10.5334/tilr.139
Schwartz, L. M. (1997). The role of numeracy in understanding the benefit of screening mammography. Annals of Internal Medicine, 127(11), 966. https://doi.org/10.7326/0003-4819-127-11-199712010-00003
Willis, L.E. (2009) Against Financial Literacy Education. Public Law Research Paper, 94(8-10), 260-275. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1105384
Simpson, W.B. (1975). A History of the Common Law of Contract: The Rise of the Action of Assumpsit. Oxford University Press.
United States of America. (2018). Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Consumer Response Annual Report. https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_consumer-response-annual-report_2018.pdf
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