Las reglas predeterminadas de decisión en el derecho. Bases para una reflexión teórica
Las “reglas u opciones predeterminadas” son estructuras ubicuas en múltiples áreas del derecho. Aunque este tipo de reglas se han estudiado en el derecho de los contratos, más allá de este ámbito no han suscitado mayor interés en la doctrina jurídica de tradición civilista. Si bien esta doctrina ha sostenido reiteradamente que las reglas predeterminadas preservan per se un continuum en la libertad de decisión de sus destinatarios, este artículo refuta esta tesis y argumenta que estas reglas producen una profunda pero inadvertida afectación a la autonomía individual y la libertad de decisión individual. En esta perspectiva, el artículo reflexiona en torno a por qué en algunas áreas del derecho ciertos contenidos de las reglas predeterminadas... Ver más
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Daniel Alejandro Monroy Cely - 2020
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Las reglas predeterminadas de decisión en el derecho. Bases para una reflexión teórica Korobkin, R. “Inertia and preference in contract negotiation: the psychological power of default rules and form terms”, Vanderbilt Law Review, vol. 51, n.° 6, 1998, 1583-1651. Rebonato, R., “A critical assessment of libertarian paternalism”, Journal of Consumer Policy, vol. 37, n.° 3, 2014, 357-396. Monroy, D., “Reglas supletivas ‘sancionatorias’ en el derecho de contratos colombiano: el caso del contrato de transporte”, Revista de Derecho Privado, Universidad Externado de Colombia, n.° 30, 2016, 221-254. Monroy, D., “Acerca del diseño óptimo de las reglas predeterminadas en el derecho de contratos”, en aa.vv., Colección Enrique Low Murtra: Derecho Económico, Bogotá, Universidad Externado de Colombia, 2017, 15-62. Mises, L. v., Economic Policy Thoughts for Today and Tomorrow, Alabama, Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2006. Madrian, B. y Shea, D., “The power of suggestion: inertia in 401(k) participation and savings behavior”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 116, n.° 4, 2001, 1149-1187. MacKay, D. y Robinson, A., “The ethics of organ donor registration policies: nudges and respect for autonomy”, The American Journal of Bioethics, vol. 16, n.° 11, 2016, 3-12. Luoto, J. y Carman, K., Behavioral Economics Guidelines with Applications for Health Interventions, Washington, Inter-American Development Bank, 2014. Lunn, P., Regulatory Policy and Behavioural Economics, oecd Publications, 2014. Korobkin, R., “The status quo bias and contract default rules”, Cornell Law Review, vol. 83, 1998, 608-687. Kesan, J. P. y Shah, R., “Setting software defaults: perspectives from law, computer science and behavioral economics”, Notre Dame Law Review, vol. 82, n.º 2, 2006, 583-634. Smith, N. C., Goldstein, D. y Johnson, E., “Choice without awareness: ethical and policy implications of defaults”, Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, vol. 32 n.° 2, 2013, 159-172. Johnson, E., Shu, S., Dellaert, B., Fox, C., Goldstein, D., Häubl, G. y Weber, E., “Beyond nudges: tools of a choice architecture”, Marketing Letters, vol. 23, n.° 2, 2012, 491. Johnson, E. y Goldstein, D., “Decisions by default”, en Shafir, E., The Behavioral Foundations of Public Policy, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2013, 417-427. Johnson E., Bellman, S. y Lohse, G. “Defaults, framing and privacy: why opting in-opting out”, Marketing Letters, vol. 13, n.° 1, 2002, 5-15. Johnson, E. y Goldstein, D., “Do defaults save lives?”, Science, vol. 302, n.º 5649, 2003, 1338-1339. Ginsberg, A., “Google - Do not pass go, do not collect $200: why the tech giant is a ‘bad’ monopoly”, Hastings Law Journal, vol. 71, n.° 3, 2020,783-812. Gevers, S., Janssen, A. y Friele, R. “Consent systems for post mortem organ donation in Europe”, European Journal of Health Law, vol. 11, 2004, 175-186. Ferejohn, J. y Friedman, B., “Toward a Political Theory of Constitutional Default Rules”, Florida State University Law Review, vol. 33, n.º 3, 2006, 825-860. Edelman, B. y Geradin, D., “Android and competition law: exploring and assessing Google’s practices in mobile”, European Competition Journal, vol. 12, n.° 2-3, 2016, 159-194. Dinner, I. Johnson, E., Goldstein, D. y Liu, K., “Partitioning default effects: why people choose not to choose”, Journal of Experimental Psychology, vol. 17, n.º 4, 2011, 332-341. Schwartz, A., “The default rule paradigm and the limits of contract law”, Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal, vol. 3, 1994, 389-419. Stucke, M., “Behavioral antitrust and monopolization”, Journal of Competition Law & Economics, vol. 8, n.° 3, 2012, 545-574. Choi, J., Laibson, D., Madrian, B. y Metrick, A., “For better or for worse: default effects and 401(k) savings behavior”, en Wise, D., Perspectives on the Economics of Aging, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2004, 81-125. Wright, J. y Ginsburg, D., “Behavioral Law and Economics: its origins, fatal flaws, and implications for liberty”, Northwestern University Law Review, vol. 106, n.° 3, 2012, 1033-1090. Text http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion http://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/ARTREF http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 info:eu-repo/semantics/article Zamir, E. y Medina, B., Law, Economics, and Morality, New York, Oxford University Press, 2010. Willis, L., “Why not privacy by default?”, Loyola-LA Legal Studies, Paper No. 2013-37, 2014, 1-74. Stucke, M., “Behavioral exploitation and its implications on competition and consumer protection policies”, en aa.vv., The Pros and Cons of Consumer Protection, Växjö, Davidsons Tryckeri, 2012, 77-122. Willis, L., “When nudges fail: slippery defaults”, The University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 80, n.º 3, 2013, 1155-1229. Wilkinson, T. M., “Nudging and manipulation”, Political Studies, vol. 61, n.° 2, 2013, 341-355. White, M. “Behavioral Law and Economics: the assault on consent, will, and dignity”, en Favor C. et al., Essays on Philosophy, Politics & Economics: Integration & Common Research Projects, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2010. W3schools, The Most Popular Browsers 2002-2020, [en línea], disponible en: https://www.w3schools.com/browsers/ [consultado el 15 de septiembre de 2020] Thaler, R., Sunstein, C. y Balz, J., “Choice architecture”, en Shafir, E., The Behavioral Foundations of Public Policy, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2013, 428-439. Suntein, C., Paternalismo libertario, Barcelona, Herder, 2017. Sunstein, C., Impersonal Default Rules vs. Active Choices vs. Personalized Default Rules: A Triptych, Working Paper, 2013. Sunstein, C., “Deciding by default”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 162, n.° 1, 2013, 1-57. Sunstein, C. y Thaler, R., “Libertarian paternalism is not an oxymoron”, The University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 70, n.° 4, 2003, 1159-1202. Sunstein, C., Choosing Not to Choose: Understanding the Value of Choice, New York, Oxford University Press, 2015. Cofone, I., “The way the cookie crumbles: online tracking meets behavioural economics”, International Journal of Law and Information Technology, vol. 25, n.° 1, 2017, 38-62. Choi, J., Laibson, D., Madrian, B. y Metrick, A., “Defined contribution pensions: plan rules, participant choices, and the path of least resistance”, Tax Policy and the Economy, vol. 16, 2002, 67-113. Choi, J., Laibson, D., Madrian, B. y Metrick, A., “Passive decisions and potent defaults”, en Wise, D., Analyses in the Economics of Aging, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2005, 59-78. https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/derpri/article/view/6920 Las “reglas u opciones predeterminadas” son estructuras ubicuas en múltiples áreas del derecho. Aunque este tipo de reglas se han estudiado en el derecho de los contratos, más allá de este ámbito no han suscitado mayor interés en la doctrina jurídica de tradición civilista. Si bien esta doctrina ha sostenido reiteradamente que las reglas predeterminadas preservan per se un continuum en la libertad de decisión de sus destinatarios, este artículo refuta esta tesis y argumenta que estas reglas producen una profunda pero inadvertida afectación a la autonomía individual y la libertad de decisión individual. En esta perspectiva, el artículo reflexiona en torno a por qué en algunas áreas del derecho ciertos contenidos de las reglas predeterminadas pueden calificarse como éticamente inadmisibles. El artículo además sugiere algunos criterios preliminares para determinar “cómo” debiera diseñarse el contenido de las reglas predeterminadas. Monroy Cely, Daniel Alejandro reglas predeterminadas; elección activa; doctrina del derecho civil; autonomía individual; libertad de decisión 40 Núm. 40 , Año 2021 : Enero-Junio Artículo de revista application/pdf text/html Departamento de Derecho Civil Revista de Derecho Privado application/xml Español Arruñada, B., “The role of institutions in the contractual process”, en Deffains, B. y Kirat, T., Law and Economics in Civil Law Countries, Amsterdam, Elsevier Science, 2001, 154. Choi, J., Laibson, D., Madrian, B. y Metrick, A., “Optimal defaults”, The American Economic Review, vol. 93 n.° 2, 2003, 180-185. Carroll, G., Choi, J., Laibson, D., Madrian, B. y Metrick, A., “Optimal defaults and active decisions”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 124, n.° 4, 2009, 1639-1674. Bovens, L., “The ethics of nudge”, en Grüne-Yanoff, T. y Hansson, S., Preference Change, Dordrecht, Springer, 2009, 207-219. Beshears, J., Choi, J., Laibson, D. y Madrian, B., “How are preferences revealed?”, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 92 n.° 8-9, 2008, 1787-1794. Beshears, J., Choi, J., Laibson, D. y Madrian, B., “The importance of default options for retirement saving outcomes: evidence from the United States”, en Brown, J., Liebman, J. y Wise, D., Social Security Policy in a Changing Environment, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2009, 167-195. Bartling, B. y Fischbacher, U., “Shifting the blame: on delegation and responsibility”, The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 79, n.° 1, 2012, 67-87. Barnett, R., “The sound of silence: default rules and contractual consent”, Virginia Law Review, vol. 78, 1992, 821-911. Ayres, I., “Regulating opt-out: an economic theory of altering rules”, Yale Law Journal, vol. 121, 2012, 2032-2116. Ayres, I. y Gertner, R., “Filling gaps in incomplete contracts: an economic theory of default rules”, The Yale Law Journal, vol. 99 n.° 1, 1989, 87-130. Publication 39530 Microsoft (Tying), Asunto comp/39.530, [en línea], Comisión Europea, 16 de diciembre de 2009, disponible en: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39530 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ Daniel Alejandro Monroy Cely - 2020 freedom of choice Journal article Default Rules in the Law: Toward a Theoretical Framework Default rules are ubiquitous structures in multiple areas of law. Whereas these types of rules have been studied in contract law, beyond this area, default rules have not attracted much interest from civil law doctrine. Although this doctrine has repeatedly held that default rules preserve per se a continuum in the freedom of choice of their addressees, this paper contests this thesis and argues that these rules produce a deep but unnoticed impact on autonomy and individual freedom of choice. In this order, the paper reflects about why in certain areas of law and why certain contents of the default rules can be qualified as ethically inadmissible. The paper also suggests some preliminary criteria to determine “how” the content of the default rules should be designed. default rules; active choice; civil law doctrine; individual autonomy; 10.18601/01234366.n40.04 2020-12-01 https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/derpri/article/download/6920/10106 https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/derpri/article/download/6920/9696 2020-12-01T14:37:34Z 2346-2442 0123-4366 87 118 https://doi.org/10.18601/01234366.n40.04 2020-12-01T14:37:34Z https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/derpri/article/download/6920/9487 |
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Revista de Derecho Privado |
| title |
Las reglas predeterminadas de decisión en el derecho. Bases para una reflexión teórica |
| spellingShingle |
Las reglas predeterminadas de decisión en el derecho. Bases para una reflexión teórica Monroy Cely, Daniel Alejandro reglas predeterminadas; elección activa; doctrina del derecho civil; autonomía individual; libertad de decisión freedom of choice default rules; active choice; civil law doctrine; individual autonomy; |
| title_short |
Las reglas predeterminadas de decisión en el derecho. Bases para una reflexión teórica |
| title_full |
Las reglas predeterminadas de decisión en el derecho. Bases para una reflexión teórica |
| title_fullStr |
Las reglas predeterminadas de decisión en el derecho. Bases para una reflexión teórica |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Las reglas predeterminadas de decisión en el derecho. Bases para una reflexión teórica |
| title_sort |
las reglas predeterminadas de decisión en el derecho. bases para una reflexión teórica |
| title_eng |
Default Rules in the Law: Toward a Theoretical Framework |
| description |
Las “reglas u opciones predeterminadas” son estructuras ubicuas en múltiples áreas del derecho. Aunque este tipo de reglas se han estudiado en el derecho de los contratos, más allá de este ámbito no han suscitado mayor interés en la doctrina jurídica de tradición civilista. Si bien esta doctrina ha sostenido reiteradamente que las reglas predeterminadas preservan per se un continuum en la libertad de decisión de sus destinatarios, este artículo refuta esta tesis y argumenta que estas reglas producen una profunda pero inadvertida afectación a la autonomía individual y la libertad de decisión individual. En esta perspectiva, el artículo reflexiona en torno a por qué en algunas áreas del derecho ciertos contenidos de las reglas predeterminadas pueden calificarse como éticamente inadmisibles. El artículo además sugiere algunos criterios preliminares para determinar “cómo” debiera diseñarse el contenido de las reglas predeterminadas.
|
| description_eng |
Default rules are ubiquitous structures in multiple areas of law. Whereas these types of rules have been studied in contract law, beyond this area, default rules have not attracted much interest from civil law doctrine. Although this doctrine has repeatedly held that default rules preserve per se a continuum in the freedom of choice of their addressees, this paper contests this thesis and argues that these rules produce a deep but unnoticed impact on autonomy and individual freedom of choice. In this order, the paper reflects about why in certain areas of law and why certain contents of the default rules can be qualified as ethically inadmissible. The paper also suggests some preliminary criteria to determine “how” the content of the default rules should be designed.
|
| author |
Monroy Cely, Daniel Alejandro |
| author_facet |
Monroy Cely, Daniel Alejandro |
| topicspa_str_mv |
reglas predeterminadas; elección activa; doctrina del derecho civil; autonomía individual; libertad de decisión |
| topic |
reglas predeterminadas; elección activa; doctrina del derecho civil; autonomía individual; libertad de decisión freedom of choice default rules; active choice; civil law doctrine; individual autonomy; |
| topic_facet |
reglas predeterminadas; elección activa; doctrina del derecho civil; autonomía individual; libertad de decisión freedom of choice default rules; active choice; civil law doctrine; individual autonomy; |
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40 |
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Núm. 40 , Año 2021 : Enero-Junio |
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Departamento de Derecho Civil |
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Revista de Derecho Privado |
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https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/derpri/article/view/6920 |
| language |
Español |
| format |
Article |
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http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ Daniel Alejandro Monroy Cely - 2020 |
| references |
Korobkin, R. “Inertia and preference in contract negotiation: the psychological power of default rules and form terms”, Vanderbilt Law Review, vol. 51, n.° 6, 1998, 1583-1651. Rebonato, R., “A critical assessment of libertarian paternalism”, Journal of Consumer Policy, vol. 37, n.° 3, 2014, 357-396. Monroy, D., “Reglas supletivas ‘sancionatorias’ en el derecho de contratos colombiano: el caso del contrato de transporte”, Revista de Derecho Privado, Universidad Externado de Colombia, n.° 30, 2016, 221-254. Monroy, D., “Acerca del diseño óptimo de las reglas predeterminadas en el derecho de contratos”, en aa.vv., Colección Enrique Low Murtra: Derecho Económico, Bogotá, Universidad Externado de Colombia, 2017, 15-62. Mises, L. v., Economic Policy Thoughts for Today and Tomorrow, Alabama, Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2006. Madrian, B. y Shea, D., “The power of suggestion: inertia in 401(k) participation and savings behavior”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 116, n.° 4, 2001, 1149-1187. MacKay, D. y Robinson, A., “The ethics of organ donor registration policies: nudges and respect for autonomy”, The American Journal of Bioethics, vol. 16, n.° 11, 2016, 3-12. Luoto, J. y Carman, K., Behavioral Economics Guidelines with Applications for Health Interventions, Washington, Inter-American Development Bank, 2014. Lunn, P., Regulatory Policy and Behavioural Economics, oecd Publications, 2014. Korobkin, R., “The status quo bias and contract default rules”, Cornell Law Review, vol. 83, 1998, 608-687. Kesan, J. P. y Shah, R., “Setting software defaults: perspectives from law, computer science and behavioral economics”, Notre Dame Law Review, vol. 82, n.º 2, 2006, 583-634. Smith, N. C., Goldstein, D. y Johnson, E., “Choice without awareness: ethical and policy implications of defaults”, Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, vol. 32 n.° 2, 2013, 159-172. Johnson, E., Shu, S., Dellaert, B., Fox, C., Goldstein, D., Häubl, G. y Weber, E., “Beyond nudges: tools of a choice architecture”, Marketing Letters, vol. 23, n.° 2, 2012, 491. Johnson, E. y Goldstein, D., “Decisions by default”, en Shafir, E., The Behavioral Foundations of Public Policy, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2013, 417-427. Johnson E., Bellman, S. y Lohse, G. “Defaults, framing and privacy: why opting in-opting out”, Marketing Letters, vol. 13, n.° 1, 2002, 5-15. Johnson, E. y Goldstein, D., “Do defaults save lives?”, Science, vol. 302, n.º 5649, 2003, 1338-1339. Ginsberg, A., “Google - Do not pass go, do not collect $200: why the tech giant is a ‘bad’ monopoly”, Hastings Law Journal, vol. 71, n.° 3, 2020,783-812. Gevers, S., Janssen, A. y Friele, R. “Consent systems for post mortem organ donation in Europe”, European Journal of Health Law, vol. 11, 2004, 175-186. Ferejohn, J. y Friedman, B., “Toward a Political Theory of Constitutional Default Rules”, Florida State University Law Review, vol. 33, n.º 3, 2006, 825-860. Edelman, B. y Geradin, D., “Android and competition law: exploring and assessing Google’s practices in mobile”, European Competition Journal, vol. 12, n.° 2-3, 2016, 159-194. Dinner, I. Johnson, E., Goldstein, D. y Liu, K., “Partitioning default effects: why people choose not to choose”, Journal of Experimental Psychology, vol. 17, n.º 4, 2011, 332-341. Schwartz, A., “The default rule paradigm and the limits of contract law”, Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal, vol. 3, 1994, 389-419. Stucke, M., “Behavioral antitrust and monopolization”, Journal of Competition Law & Economics, vol. 8, n.° 3, 2012, 545-574. Choi, J., Laibson, D., Madrian, B. y Metrick, A., “For better or for worse: default effects and 401(k) savings behavior”, en Wise, D., Perspectives on the Economics of Aging, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2004, 81-125. Wright, J. y Ginsburg, D., “Behavioral Law and Economics: its origins, fatal flaws, and implications for liberty”, Northwestern University Law Review, vol. 106, n.° 3, 2012, 1033-1090. Zamir, E. y Medina, B., Law, Economics, and Morality, New York, Oxford University Press, 2010. Willis, L., “Why not privacy by default?”, Loyola-LA Legal Studies, Paper No. 2013-37, 2014, 1-74. Stucke, M., “Behavioral exploitation and its implications on competition and consumer protection policies”, en aa.vv., The Pros and Cons of Consumer Protection, Växjö, Davidsons Tryckeri, 2012, 77-122. Willis, L., “When nudges fail: slippery defaults”, The University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 80, n.º 3, 2013, 1155-1229. Wilkinson, T. M., “Nudging and manipulation”, Political Studies, vol. 61, n.° 2, 2013, 341-355. White, M. “Behavioral Law and Economics: the assault on consent, will, and dignity”, en Favor C. et al., Essays on Philosophy, Politics & Economics: Integration & Common Research Projects, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2010. W3schools, The Most Popular Browsers 2002-2020, [en línea], disponible en: https://www.w3schools.com/browsers/ [consultado el 15 de septiembre de 2020] Thaler, R., Sunstein, C. y Balz, J., “Choice architecture”, en Shafir, E., The Behavioral Foundations of Public Policy, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2013, 428-439. Suntein, C., Paternalismo libertario, Barcelona, Herder, 2017. Sunstein, C., Impersonal Default Rules vs. Active Choices vs. Personalized Default Rules: A Triptych, Working Paper, 2013. Sunstein, C., “Deciding by default”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 162, n.° 1, 2013, 1-57. Sunstein, C. y Thaler, R., “Libertarian paternalism is not an oxymoron”, The University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 70, n.° 4, 2003, 1159-1202. Sunstein, C., Choosing Not to Choose: Understanding the Value of Choice, New York, Oxford University Press, 2015. Cofone, I., “The way the cookie crumbles: online tracking meets behavioural economics”, International Journal of Law and Information Technology, vol. 25, n.° 1, 2017, 38-62. Choi, J., Laibson, D., Madrian, B. y Metrick, A., “Defined contribution pensions: plan rules, participant choices, and the path of least resistance”, Tax Policy and the Economy, vol. 16, 2002, 67-113. Choi, J., Laibson, D., Madrian, B. y Metrick, A., “Passive decisions and potent defaults”, en Wise, D., Analyses in the Economics of Aging, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2005, 59-78. Arruñada, B., “The role of institutions in the contractual process”, en Deffains, B. y Kirat, T., Law and Economics in Civil Law Countries, Amsterdam, Elsevier Science, 2001, 154. Choi, J., Laibson, D., Madrian, B. y Metrick, A., “Optimal defaults”, The American Economic Review, vol. 93 n.° 2, 2003, 180-185. Carroll, G., Choi, J., Laibson, D., Madrian, B. y Metrick, A., “Optimal defaults and active decisions”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 124, n.° 4, 2009, 1639-1674. Bovens, L., “The ethics of nudge”, en Grüne-Yanoff, T. y Hansson, S., Preference Change, Dordrecht, Springer, 2009, 207-219. Beshears, J., Choi, J., Laibson, D. y Madrian, B., “How are preferences revealed?”, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 92 n.° 8-9, 2008, 1787-1794. Beshears, J., Choi, J., Laibson, D. y Madrian, B., “The importance of default options for retirement saving outcomes: evidence from the United States”, en Brown, J., Liebman, J. y Wise, D., Social Security Policy in a Changing Environment, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2009, 167-195. Bartling, B. y Fischbacher, U., “Shifting the blame: on delegation and responsibility”, The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 79, n.° 1, 2012, 67-87. Barnett, R., “The sound of silence: default rules and contractual consent”, Virginia Law Review, vol. 78, 1992, 821-911. Ayres, I., “Regulating opt-out: an economic theory of altering rules”, Yale Law Journal, vol. 121, 2012, 2032-2116. Ayres, I. y Gertner, R., “Filling gaps in incomplete contracts: an economic theory of default rules”, The Yale Law Journal, vol. 99 n.° 1, 1989, 87-130. 39530 Microsoft (Tying), Asunto comp/39.530, [en línea], Comisión Europea, 16 de diciembre de 2009, disponible en: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39530 |
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