La impotencia de las representaciones: una crítica a la ontología social de John Searle
John Searle ha defendido un enfoque intencionalista de lo social, a saber, la idea de que la realidad social es creada y mantenida por ciertos estados mentalesy actos de habla. En este trabajo, en primer lugar, presentamos una versión detallada de los argumentos fundacionales de Searle, basada en la conexión entrereconocimiento colectivo y lenguaje. En segundo lugar, ofrecemos una crítica de estos argumentos, sugiriendo que ellos mismos nos llevan a admitir que losfundamentos de la realidad social son más prácticos que representacionales.
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Discusiones Filosóficas - 2020
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La impotencia de las representaciones: una crítica a la ontología social de John Searle Searle, John, Ferraris, Maurizio & Condello, Angela. Money, social ontology and law. Nueva York: Routledge. 2019. Print. Brandom, Robert. “A hegelian model of legal concept determination: the normative fine structure of the judge’s chain novel”. Hubbs, Graham y Lind, Douglas (Eds.) Pragmatism, law and language. New York: Routledge. 2014. Print. ______. “Some pragmatist themes in Hegel’s idealism”. Tales of the mighty dead (pp. 210-234). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2002. Print. ______. Making it explicit: reasoning, representing and discursive commitment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1994. Print. Chant, Sara, Hindriks, Frank & Preyer, Gerhard. (eds.) From individual to collective Intentionality: New Essays, Nueva York: Oxford University Press. (2014). Print. Gilbert, Margaret. “Acting together”. Joint commitment: How we make the social world. Nueva York: Oxford University Press. (2014). Print. Hornsby, Jennifer. (1997). “Collectives and intentionality”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Jun. 57 (2). 1997: pp. 429-434. Print. Kukla, Rebecca & Lance, Mark. Yo and Lo: The pragmatic topography of the space of reasons. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2009. Print. Lawson, Tony. “Comparing conceptions of social ontology: emergent social entities and/or institutional facts?” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. Dec. 46 (4). 2016: 359-399. Print. ______. “A conception of social ontology”. Pratten, Stephen (Ed.). Social ontology and modern economics. New York: Routledge. 2015. Print. Malinowski, Bronislaw. Crimen y costumbre en la sociedad salvaje. Barcelona: Planeta-De Agostini. 1985. Impreso. Rouse, Joseph. “Social practices and normativity”. Philosophy of the Social Sciences. Mar. 37 (1). 2007: pp.1-11. Print. ______. How scientific practices matter: reclaiming philosophical naturalism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2002. Print. Sánchez Cuenca, Ignacio. “A behavioural critique of Searle’s theory of institutions”. Tsohatzidis, S. (Ed.) Intentional acts and institutional facts: essays on John Searle’s social ontology. Dordrecht: Springer. 2007. Print. ______. Making the social world: the structure of human civilization. Nueva York: Oxford University Press. 2010. Print. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ ______. “Responses to critics of The Construction of Social Reality”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Jun. 57(2). 1997: pp. 449-458. Print. ______. The construction of social reality. Nueva York: The Free Press. 1995. Print. Smith, Barry. “John Searle: From speech acts to social reality”. Smith, B. (ed.) John Searle. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. (2003) Print. Vicari, Giuseppe. “Collective intentionality, language and normativity: a problem and a possible solution for the analysis of cooperation”. Epkeina. 5 (1). 2015: 183-207. Wilson, Robert. “Social reality and institutional facts”. Tsohatzidis, S. (Ed.) Intentional acts and institutional facts: essays on John Searle’s social ontology. Dordrecht: Springer. 2007. Print. Zimmermann, Stephan. “Is society built on collective intentions? A response to John Searle”. Rivista di estetica. 57. 2014: pp. 121-141. Print. info:eu-repo/semantics/article http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 Text Bratman, Michael. “Shared Intention”. Ethics. Oct. 104 (1). 1993: 97-113. Print. Discusiones Filosóficas - 2020 Español Artículo de revista John Searle ha defendido un enfoque intencionalista de lo social, a saber, la idea de que la realidad social es creada y mantenida por ciertos estados mentalesy actos de habla. En este trabajo, en primer lugar, presentamos una versión detallada de los argumentos fundacionales de Searle, basada en la conexión entrereconocimiento colectivo y lenguaje. En segundo lugar, ofrecemos una crítica de estos argumentos, sugiriendo que ellos mismos nos llevan a admitir que losfundamentos de la realidad social son más prácticos que representacionales. Giromi, José Ontología social normatividad John Searle filosofía de la mente pragmatismo 21 36 Núm. 36 , Año 2020 : Enero - Junio Publication https://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/view/2535 application/pdf Universidad de Caldas Discusiones Filosóficas John Searle John Searle has advocated an intentionalist approach to the social, namely the idea that social reality is created and maintained by certain mental states and speech acts. In this work, we first present a detailed version of Searle’s intentionalist founding arguments based on the connection between collective recognition and language. In the second place, we offer a critique of these arguments, suggesting that they lead us to admit that the foundationsof social reality are more practical than representational. Social ontology normativity philosophy of mind pragmatism The impotence of representations: a criticism of John Searle's social ontology Journal article 2020-01-01T00:00:00Z 0124-6127 https://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/download/2535/2345 2462-9596 10.17151/difil.2020.21.36.6 https://doi.org/10.17151/difil.2020.21.36.6 104 2020-01-01T00:00:00Z 79 2020-01-01 |
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Discusiones Filosóficas |
| title |
La impotencia de las representaciones: una crítica a la ontología social de John Searle |
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La impotencia de las representaciones: una crítica a la ontología social de John Searle Giromi, José Ontología social normatividad John Searle filosofía de la mente pragmatismo John Searle Social ontology normativity philosophy of mind pragmatism |
| title_short |
La impotencia de las representaciones: una crítica a la ontología social de John Searle |
| title_full |
La impotencia de las representaciones: una crítica a la ontología social de John Searle |
| title_fullStr |
La impotencia de las representaciones: una crítica a la ontología social de John Searle |
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La impotencia de las representaciones: una crítica a la ontología social de John Searle |
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la impotencia de las representaciones: una crítica a la ontología social de john searle |
| title_eng |
The impotence of representations: a criticism of John Searle's social ontology |
| description |
John Searle ha defendido un enfoque intencionalista de lo social, a saber, la idea de que la realidad social es creada y mantenida por ciertos estados mentalesy actos de habla. En este trabajo, en primer lugar, presentamos una versión detallada de los argumentos fundacionales de Searle, basada en la conexión entrereconocimiento colectivo y lenguaje. En segundo lugar, ofrecemos una crítica de estos argumentos, sugiriendo que ellos mismos nos llevan a admitir que losfundamentos de la realidad social son más prácticos que representacionales.
|
| description_eng |
John Searle has advocated an intentionalist approach to the social, namely the idea that social reality is created and maintained by certain mental states and speech acts. In this work, we first present a detailed version of Searle’s intentionalist founding arguments based on the connection between collective recognition and language. In the second place, we offer a critique of these arguments, suggesting that they lead us to admit that the foundationsof social reality are more practical than representational.
|
| author |
Giromi, José |
| author_facet |
Giromi, José |
| topicspa_str_mv |
Ontología social normatividad John Searle filosofía de la mente pragmatismo |
| topic |
Ontología social normatividad John Searle filosofía de la mente pragmatismo John Searle Social ontology normativity philosophy of mind pragmatism |
| topic_facet |
Ontología social normatividad John Searle filosofía de la mente pragmatismo John Searle Social ontology normativity philosophy of mind pragmatism |
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21 |
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36 |
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Núm. 36 , Año 2020 : Enero - Junio |
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Universidad de Caldas |
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Discusiones Filosóficas |
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https://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/view/2535 |
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Español |
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Article |
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https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 Discusiones Filosóficas - 2020 |
| references |
Searle, John, Ferraris, Maurizio & Condello, Angela. Money, social ontology and law. Nueva York: Routledge. 2019. Print. Brandom, Robert. “A hegelian model of legal concept determination: the normative fine structure of the judge’s chain novel”. Hubbs, Graham y Lind, Douglas (Eds.) Pragmatism, law and language. New York: Routledge. 2014. Print. ______. “Some pragmatist themes in Hegel’s idealism”. Tales of the mighty dead (pp. 210-234). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2002. Print. ______. Making it explicit: reasoning, representing and discursive commitment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1994. Print. Chant, Sara, Hindriks, Frank & Preyer, Gerhard. (eds.) From individual to collective Intentionality: New Essays, Nueva York: Oxford University Press. (2014). Print. Gilbert, Margaret. “Acting together”. Joint commitment: How we make the social world. Nueva York: Oxford University Press. (2014). Print. Hornsby, Jennifer. (1997). “Collectives and intentionality”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Jun. 57 (2). 1997: pp. 429-434. Print. Kukla, Rebecca & Lance, Mark. Yo and Lo: The pragmatic topography of the space of reasons. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2009. Print. Lawson, Tony. “Comparing conceptions of social ontology: emergent social entities and/or institutional facts?” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. Dec. 46 (4). 2016: 359-399. Print. ______. “A conception of social ontology”. Pratten, Stephen (Ed.). Social ontology and modern economics. New York: Routledge. 2015. Print. Malinowski, Bronislaw. Crimen y costumbre en la sociedad salvaje. Barcelona: Planeta-De Agostini. 1985. Impreso. Rouse, Joseph. “Social practices and normativity”. Philosophy of the Social Sciences. Mar. 37 (1). 2007: pp.1-11. Print. ______. How scientific practices matter: reclaiming philosophical naturalism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2002. Print. Sánchez Cuenca, Ignacio. “A behavioural critique of Searle’s theory of institutions”. Tsohatzidis, S. (Ed.) Intentional acts and institutional facts: essays on John Searle’s social ontology. Dordrecht: Springer. 2007. Print. ______. Making the social world: the structure of human civilization. Nueva York: Oxford University Press. 2010. Print. ______. “Responses to critics of The Construction of Social Reality”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Jun. 57(2). 1997: pp. 449-458. Print. ______. The construction of social reality. Nueva York: The Free Press. 1995. Print. Smith, Barry. “John Searle: From speech acts to social reality”. Smith, B. (ed.) John Searle. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. (2003) Print. Vicari, Giuseppe. “Collective intentionality, language and normativity: a problem and a possible solution for the analysis of cooperation”. Epkeina. 5 (1). 2015: 183-207. Wilson, Robert. “Social reality and institutional facts”. Tsohatzidis, S. (Ed.) Intentional acts and institutional facts: essays on John Searle’s social ontology. Dordrecht: Springer. 2007. Print. Zimmermann, Stephan. “Is society built on collective intentions? A response to John Searle”. Rivista di estetica. 57. 2014: pp. 121-141. Print. Bratman, Michael. “Shared Intention”. Ethics. Oct. 104 (1). 1993: 97-113. Print. |
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