Optimal Early Termination in PPP Projects Based on Real Options Theory

Optimal Early Termination in PPP Projects Based on Real Options Theory

La terminación anticipada es un mecanismo de compensación contractual implementado en proyectos de infraestructura de app, donde los inversionistas privados tienen derecho a abandonar el proyecto para mitigar riesgos como el de demanda. En este artículo utilizamos la teoría de opciones reales para valorar la terminación anticipada como una opción de abandono de un proyecto, en el que el riesgo de demanda y la tarifa de compensación se modelan asumiendo procesos estocásticos correlacionados. Así, se implementa el modelo de valo­ración de opciones con una solución analítica y se comparan los resultados con la técnica de simulación Monte Carlo. Los resultados confirman los beneficios que el mecanismo contractual ofrece a los inversionistas pri... Ver más

Guardado en:

Revista ODEON

1794-1113

2346-2140

Zapata Quimbayo, Carlos Andrés

Mejía Veja, Carlos Armando

UNIVERSIDAD EXTERNADO DE COLOMBIA

10.18601/17941113.n25.06

2024-03-21

117

141

Colombia

proyectos de infraestructura;

opción de abandono;

mecanismo de terminación anticipada

http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2

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Carlos Andrés Zapata Quimbayo, Carlos Armando Mejía Veja - 2024

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spelling Optimal Early Termination in PPP Projects Based on Real Options Theory
Ho, P., & Liu, L. (2002). An option pricing-based model for evaluating the financial viability of privatized infrastructure projects. Construction Management and Economics, 20(2), 143-156. https://doi.org/10.1080/01446190110110533
Longstaff, F., & Schwartz, E. (2001). Valuing American options by simulation: a simple least-squares approach. The Review of Financial Studies, 14(1), 113-147. https:// doi.org/ 10.1093/rfs/14.1.113
Liu, J., Gao, R., & Cheah, C. (2017). Pricing mechanism of early termination of PPP projects based on real option theory. Journal of Management in Engineering, 33(6), 04017035. https://doi.org/10.1061/(asce)me.1943-5479.0000556
Liu, J., Yu, X. & Cheah, C. (2014). Evaluation of restrictive competition in PPP projects using real option approach. International Journal of Project Management, 32(3), 473-481. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2013.07.007
Liu, J., Love, P., Davis, P., Smith, J., & Regan, M. (2015). Conceptual framework for the performance measurement of public-private partnerships. Journal of Infrastructure Systems, 21(1), 04014023. https://doi.org/10.1061/(asce)IS.1943-555X.0000210
Iyer, K., & Sagheer, M. (2011). A real options-based traffic risk mitigation model for build-operate-transfer highway projects in India. Construction Management and Economics, 29(8), 771-9. https://doi.org/10.1080/01446193.2011.597412
Iossa, E., & Martimort, D. (2016). Corruption in PPPS, incentives and contract incom-pleteness. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 44(1), 85-100. https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.10.007
Igrejas, R., Cordeiro, L. & Brandão, L. (2017). When is abandonment not an option? Dealing with PPP contract and government interests. Advances in Public-Private Partnerships–Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Public-Private Partnerships (pp. 486-498). https://doi.org/10.1061/9780784480267.038
Guasch, J. L., & Straub, S. (2009). Corruption and concession renegotiations.: Evidence from the water and transport sectors in Latin America. Utilities Policy, 17(2), 185-190. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2008.07.003
Merton, R. (1973). The theory of rational option pricing. The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 4(1), 141-183. https://doi.org/10.2307/3003143
Guasch, J., Laffont, J., & Straub, S. (2007). Concessions of infrastructure in Latin America: Government-led renegotiation. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 22(7), 1267-1294. https://doi.org/10.1002/jae.987
Grimsey, D., & Lewis, M. (2002). Evaluating the risks of public private partnerships for infrastructure projects. International Journal of Project Management, 20(2), 107-118. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0263-7863(00)00040-5
Giraldo, A. (2019). Valoración del mecanismo de terminación anticipada en los con¬tratos de concesión 4G en Colombia. odeon, (16), 67-95. https://doi.org/10.18601/ 17941113.n16.04
Gatti, S. (2008). Project Finance in Theory and Practice. Project Finance in Theory and Practice. Oxford: Academic Press.
Garvin, M., & Cheah, C. (2004). Valuation techniques for infrastructure investment decisions. Construction Management and Economics, 22(4), 373-83. https://doi. org/ 10.1080/01446190310001649010
Galilea, P., & Medda, F. (2010). Does the political and economic context influence the success of a transport project? An analysis of transport public–private partnerships. Research in Transportation Economics, 30(1), 102–109. https://doi.org/10.1016/ j.retrec.2010.10.011
Feng, Z., Zhang, S., & Gao, Y. (2015). Modelling the impact of government guarantees on toll charge, road quality and capacity for Build-Operate-Transfer (bot) road projects. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 78(1), 54-67. https://doi.org/10.1016/ j.tra.2015.05.006
Dixit, A., & Pindyck, R. (1994). Investment under Uncertainty. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Martins, J., Marques, R., & Cruz, C. (2015). Real options in infrastructure: Revisiting the literature. Journal of Infrastructure Systems, 21(1), 04014026. https://doi.org/ 10.1061/(ASCE)is.1943-555X.0000188
McDonald, R., & Siegel, D. (1986). The value of waiting to invest. Quarterly Journal Economics, 101(4), 707-727. https://doi.org/10.2307/1884175
Clark, E. & Rousseau, P. (2002). Strategic parameters for capital budgeting when abandonment value is stochastic. Applied Financial Economics, 12(2), 123-130. https://doi.org/10.1080/09603100110088049
Zapata Quimbayo, C.A., & Mejía Vega, C. A. (2022). Credit risk in infrastructure PPP projects under the real options approach. Construction Management and Economics 41(4), 293-306. https://doi.org/10.1080/01446193.2022.2151023
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Zhang, X., & Xiong, W. (2015). Renegotiation and early-termination in public private partnership. International Journal of Architecture, Engineering & Construction, 4(4), 204-213. http://dx.doi.org/10.7492/ijaec.2015.021
Myers, S., & Majd, S. (2001). Abandonment value and project life. In Real Options and Investment under Uncertainty: Classical Readings and Recent Contributions. Cambridge, 295-312.
Yescombe, E. R. (2002). Principles of Project Finance. Academic Press.
Wang, S., Dulaimi, M. & Aguria, M. (2004). Risk management framework for construction projects in developing countries. Construction Management and Economics, 22(3), 237-252. https://doi.org/10.1080/0144619032000124689
Xiong, W., Zhang, X., & Chen, H. (2015). Early-termination compensation in public– private partnership projects. Journal of Construction Engineering & Management, 142(4), 04015098. https://doi.org/10.1061/(asce)co.1943-7862.0001084
Xiong, W., & Han, Y. (2021). Incentives of Early Termination Compensation in Public–Private Partnership Projects. IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management. 1-13. https://doi.org/10.1109/tem.2021.3074662
Trigeorgis, L. (1996). Real Options: Managerial Flexibility and Strategy in Resource Allocation. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Talus, K. (2009). Public–private partnerships in energy–termination of public service concessions and administrative acts in Europe. Journal of World Energy Law & Business, 2(1), 43-67. https://doi.org/10.1093/jwelb/jwn023
Song, J., Yu, Y., Jin, L., & Feng, Z. (2018). Early termination compensation under demand uncertainty in public-private partnership projects. International Journal of Strategic Property Management, 22(6), 532-543. https://doi.org/10.3846/ ijspm.2018.6049
Scott, R., & Triantis, G. (2004). Embedded Options and the Case against Compensation in Contract Law. Columbia Law Review, 104, 1428.
Cox, J., Ross, S., & Rubinstein, M. (1979). Option pricing: A simplified approach. Journal of Financial Economics, 7(3), 229-263. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304- 405X(79)90015-1
Cheah, C., & Liu, J. (2006). Valuing governmental support in infrastructure projects as real options using Monte Carlo simulation. Construction Management and Economics, 24(5), 545-54. https://doi.org/10.1080/01446190500435572
Caselli, S., Marciante, A. & Gatti, S. (2009). Pricing final indemnification payments to private sponsors in project-financed public-private partnerships: An application of real options valuation. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 21(3), 95-106. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6622.2009.00243.x
Español
La terminación anticipada es un mecanismo de compensación contractual implementado en proyectos de infraestructura de app, donde los inversionistas privados tienen derecho a abandonar el proyecto para mitigar riesgos como el de demanda. En este artículo utilizamos la teoría de opciones reales para valorar la terminación anticipada como una opción de abandono de un proyecto, en el que el riesgo de demanda y la tarifa de compensación se modelan asumiendo procesos estocásticos correlacionados. Así, se implementa el modelo de valo­ración de opciones con una solución analítica y se comparan los resultados con la técnica de simulación Monte Carlo. Los resultados confirman los beneficios que el mecanismo contractual ofrece a los inversionistas privados para mitigar riesgos y mejorar el valor del proyecto.
Zapata Quimbayo, Carlos Andrés
Mejía Veja, Carlos Armando
proyectos de infraestructura;
opción de abandono;
mecanismo de terminación anticipada
25
Núm. 25 , Año 2023 : Julio-Diciembre
Artículo de revista
application/pdf
Universidad Externado de Colombia
ODEON
https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/odeon/article/view/9339
Publication
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0
Carlos Andrés Zapata Quimbayo, Carlos Armando Mejía Veja - 2024
Carbonara, N., & Pellegrino, R. (2018). Revenue guarantee in public–private partnerships: a win–win model. Construction Management and Economics, 1-15. https:// doi.org/10.1080/01446193.2018.1467028
Cabero, F., Sánchez, A., & Lara, A. (2017). Default and abandonment option in mo¬torway concessions. Journal of Infrastructure Systems, 23(1), 04016022. https:// doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)is.1943-555X.0000309
Buso, M., Dosi, C., & Moretto, M. (2019). Termination fees and contract design in public-private partnerships. Working paper No. 032.2018. https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/191374/1/ndl2018-032.pdf
Brennan, M., & Schwartz, E. (1985). Evaluating natural resource investments. The Journal of Business, 58(2), 135-157.
Brandão, L., & Saraiva, E. (2008). The option value of government guarantees in infrastructure projects. Construction Management and Economics, 26(11), 1171- 1180. https://doi.org/10.1080/01446190802428051
Bowe, M., & Lee, D. (2004). Project evaluation in the presence of multiple embedded real options: evidence from the Taiwan High-Speed Rail Project. Journal of Asian Economics, 15(1), 71-98. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.asieco.2003.12.001
Black, F., & Scholes, M. (1973). The pricing of options and corporate liabilities. Journal of Political Economy, 81(3), 637-659. https://doi.org/10.1142/97898147595 88_0001
Attarzadeh, M., Chua, D., Beer, M., & Abbott, E. (2017). Options-based negotiation management of PPP–BOT infrastructure projects. Construction Management and Economics, 35(11-12), 676-692. https://doi.org/10.1080/01446193.2017.1325962
Ashuri, B., Asce, M., Kashani, H., Molenaar, K., Asce, M., Lee, S. & Lu, J. (2012). Risk-neutral pricing approach for evaluating bot highway projects with government minimum revenue guarantee options. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 138(4), 545-557. https://doi.org/10.1061/(asce) co.1943-7862.0000447
Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0.
Ameyaw, E. & Chan, A. (2015). Evaluation and ranking of risk factors in public–private partnership water supply projects in developing countries using fuzzy synthetic evaluation approach. Expert Systems with Applications, 42(12), 5102-5116. https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.eswa.2015.02.041
option to abandon;
Journal article
Early termination is a contractual compensation mechanism implemented in PPP infrastructure projects where private investors have the right to abandon the project to mitigate risks such as traffic risk. In this paper we used the Real Options Theory to value early termination as an option to abandon a project where both the traffic risk and the compensation fee are modelled assuming correlated stochastic processes. The option pricing model was implemented with an analytical solution and results were compared with the Monte Carlo simulation technique. The results confirm the benefits that the contractual mechanism offers to private investors to mitigate risks, while at the same time improving a project’s value.
Optimal Early Termination in PPP Projects Based on Real Options Theory
Infrastructure projects;
early termination mechanism
2024-03-21T11:15:55Z
https://doi.org/10.18601/17941113.n25.06
10.18601/17941113.n25.06
2346-2140
2024-03-21T11:15:55Z
https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/odeon/article/download/9339/15632
117
141
2024-03-21
1794-1113
institution UNIVERSIDAD EXTERNADO DE COLOMBIA
thumbnail https://nuevo.metarevistas.org/UNIVERSIDADEXTERNADODECOLOMBIA/logo.png
country_str Colombia
collection Revista ODEON
title Optimal Early Termination in PPP Projects Based on Real Options Theory
spellingShingle Optimal Early Termination in PPP Projects Based on Real Options Theory
Zapata Quimbayo, Carlos Andrés
Mejía Veja, Carlos Armando
proyectos de infraestructura;
opción de abandono;
mecanismo de terminación anticipada
option to abandon;
Infrastructure projects;
early termination mechanism
title_short Optimal Early Termination in PPP Projects Based on Real Options Theory
title_full Optimal Early Termination in PPP Projects Based on Real Options Theory
title_fullStr Optimal Early Termination in PPP Projects Based on Real Options Theory
title_full_unstemmed Optimal Early Termination in PPP Projects Based on Real Options Theory
title_sort optimal early termination in ppp projects based on real options theory
title_eng Optimal Early Termination in PPP Projects Based on Real Options Theory
description La terminación anticipada es un mecanismo de compensación contractual implementado en proyectos de infraestructura de app, donde los inversionistas privados tienen derecho a abandonar el proyecto para mitigar riesgos como el de demanda. En este artículo utilizamos la teoría de opciones reales para valorar la terminación anticipada como una opción de abandono de un proyecto, en el que el riesgo de demanda y la tarifa de compensación se modelan asumiendo procesos estocásticos correlacionados. Así, se implementa el modelo de valo­ración de opciones con una solución analítica y se comparan los resultados con la técnica de simulación Monte Carlo. Los resultados confirman los beneficios que el mecanismo contractual ofrece a los inversionistas privados para mitigar riesgos y mejorar el valor del proyecto.
description_eng Early termination is a contractual compensation mechanism implemented in PPP infrastructure projects where private investors have the right to abandon the project to mitigate risks such as traffic risk. In this paper we used the Real Options Theory to value early termination as an option to abandon a project where both the traffic risk and the compensation fee are modelled assuming correlated stochastic processes. The option pricing model was implemented with an analytical solution and results were compared with the Monte Carlo simulation technique. The results confirm the benefits that the contractual mechanism offers to private investors to mitigate risks, while at the same time improving a project’s value.
author Zapata Quimbayo, Carlos Andrés
Mejía Veja, Carlos Armando
author_facet Zapata Quimbayo, Carlos Andrés
Mejía Veja, Carlos Armando
topicspa_str_mv proyectos de infraestructura;
opción de abandono;
mecanismo de terminación anticipada
topic proyectos de infraestructura;
opción de abandono;
mecanismo de terminación anticipada
option to abandon;
Infrastructure projects;
early termination mechanism
topic_facet proyectos de infraestructura;
opción de abandono;
mecanismo de terminación anticipada
option to abandon;
Infrastructure projects;
early termination mechanism
citationissue 25
citationedition Núm. 25 , Año 2023 : Julio-Diciembre
publisher Universidad Externado de Colombia
ispartofjournal ODEON
source https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/odeon/article/view/9339
language Español
format Article
rights http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0
Carlos Andrés Zapata Quimbayo, Carlos Armando Mejía Veja - 2024
Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0.
references Ho, P., & Liu, L. (2002). An option pricing-based model for evaluating the financial viability of privatized infrastructure projects. Construction Management and Economics, 20(2), 143-156. https://doi.org/10.1080/01446190110110533
Longstaff, F., & Schwartz, E. (2001). Valuing American options by simulation: a simple least-squares approach. The Review of Financial Studies, 14(1), 113-147. https:// doi.org/ 10.1093/rfs/14.1.113
Liu, J., Gao, R., & Cheah, C. (2017). Pricing mechanism of early termination of PPP projects based on real option theory. Journal of Management in Engineering, 33(6), 04017035. https://doi.org/10.1061/(asce)me.1943-5479.0000556
Liu, J., Yu, X. & Cheah, C. (2014). Evaluation of restrictive competition in PPP projects using real option approach. International Journal of Project Management, 32(3), 473-481. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2013.07.007
Liu, J., Love, P., Davis, P., Smith, J., & Regan, M. (2015). Conceptual framework for the performance measurement of public-private partnerships. Journal of Infrastructure Systems, 21(1), 04014023. https://doi.org/10.1061/(asce)IS.1943-555X.0000210
Iyer, K., & Sagheer, M. (2011). A real options-based traffic risk mitigation model for build-operate-transfer highway projects in India. Construction Management and Economics, 29(8), 771-9. https://doi.org/10.1080/01446193.2011.597412
Iossa, E., & Martimort, D. (2016). Corruption in PPPS, incentives and contract incom-pleteness. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 44(1), 85-100. https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.10.007
Igrejas, R., Cordeiro, L. & Brandão, L. (2017). When is abandonment not an option? Dealing with PPP contract and government interests. Advances in Public-Private Partnerships–Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Public-Private Partnerships (pp. 486-498). https://doi.org/10.1061/9780784480267.038
Guasch, J. L., & Straub, S. (2009). Corruption and concession renegotiations.: Evidence from the water and transport sectors in Latin America. Utilities Policy, 17(2), 185-190. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2008.07.003
Merton, R. (1973). The theory of rational option pricing. The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 4(1), 141-183. https://doi.org/10.2307/3003143
Guasch, J., Laffont, J., & Straub, S. (2007). Concessions of infrastructure in Latin America: Government-led renegotiation. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 22(7), 1267-1294. https://doi.org/10.1002/jae.987
Grimsey, D., & Lewis, M. (2002). Evaluating the risks of public private partnerships for infrastructure projects. International Journal of Project Management, 20(2), 107-118. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0263-7863(00)00040-5
Giraldo, A. (2019). Valoración del mecanismo de terminación anticipada en los con¬tratos de concesión 4G en Colombia. odeon, (16), 67-95. https://doi.org/10.18601/ 17941113.n16.04
Gatti, S. (2008). Project Finance in Theory and Practice. Project Finance in Theory and Practice. Oxford: Academic Press.
Garvin, M., & Cheah, C. (2004). Valuation techniques for infrastructure investment decisions. Construction Management and Economics, 22(4), 373-83. https://doi. org/ 10.1080/01446190310001649010
Galilea, P., & Medda, F. (2010). Does the political and economic context influence the success of a transport project? An analysis of transport public–private partnerships. Research in Transportation Economics, 30(1), 102–109. https://doi.org/10.1016/ j.retrec.2010.10.011
Feng, Z., Zhang, S., & Gao, Y. (2015). Modelling the impact of government guarantees on toll charge, road quality and capacity for Build-Operate-Transfer (bot) road projects. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 78(1), 54-67. https://doi.org/10.1016/ j.tra.2015.05.006
Dixit, A., & Pindyck, R. (1994). Investment under Uncertainty. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Martins, J., Marques, R., & Cruz, C. (2015). Real options in infrastructure: Revisiting the literature. Journal of Infrastructure Systems, 21(1), 04014026. https://doi.org/ 10.1061/(ASCE)is.1943-555X.0000188
McDonald, R., & Siegel, D. (1986). The value of waiting to invest. Quarterly Journal Economics, 101(4), 707-727. https://doi.org/10.2307/1884175
Clark, E. & Rousseau, P. (2002). Strategic parameters for capital budgeting when abandonment value is stochastic. Applied Financial Economics, 12(2), 123-130. https://doi.org/10.1080/09603100110088049
Zapata Quimbayo, C.A., & Mejía Vega, C. A. (2022). Credit risk in infrastructure PPP projects under the real options approach. Construction Management and Economics 41(4), 293-306. https://doi.org/10.1080/01446193.2022.2151023
Zhang, X., & Xiong, W. (2015). Renegotiation and early-termination in public private partnership. International Journal of Architecture, Engineering & Construction, 4(4), 204-213. http://dx.doi.org/10.7492/ijaec.2015.021
Myers, S., & Majd, S. (2001). Abandonment value and project life. In Real Options and Investment under Uncertainty: Classical Readings and Recent Contributions. Cambridge, 295-312.
Yescombe, E. R. (2002). Principles of Project Finance. Academic Press.
Wang, S., Dulaimi, M. & Aguria, M. (2004). Risk management framework for construction projects in developing countries. Construction Management and Economics, 22(3), 237-252. https://doi.org/10.1080/0144619032000124689
Xiong, W., Zhang, X., & Chen, H. (2015). Early-termination compensation in public– private partnership projects. Journal of Construction Engineering & Management, 142(4), 04015098. https://doi.org/10.1061/(asce)co.1943-7862.0001084
Xiong, W., & Han, Y. (2021). Incentives of Early Termination Compensation in Public–Private Partnership Projects. IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management. 1-13. https://doi.org/10.1109/tem.2021.3074662
Trigeorgis, L. (1996). Real Options: Managerial Flexibility and Strategy in Resource Allocation. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Talus, K. (2009). Public–private partnerships in energy–termination of public service concessions and administrative acts in Europe. Journal of World Energy Law & Business, 2(1), 43-67. https://doi.org/10.1093/jwelb/jwn023
Song, J., Yu, Y., Jin, L., & Feng, Z. (2018). Early termination compensation under demand uncertainty in public-private partnership projects. International Journal of Strategic Property Management, 22(6), 532-543. https://doi.org/10.3846/ ijspm.2018.6049
Scott, R., & Triantis, G. (2004). Embedded Options and the Case against Compensation in Contract Law. Columbia Law Review, 104, 1428.
Cox, J., Ross, S., & Rubinstein, M. (1979). Option pricing: A simplified approach. Journal of Financial Economics, 7(3), 229-263. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304- 405X(79)90015-1
Cheah, C., & Liu, J. (2006). Valuing governmental support in infrastructure projects as real options using Monte Carlo simulation. Construction Management and Economics, 24(5), 545-54. https://doi.org/10.1080/01446190500435572
Caselli, S., Marciante, A. & Gatti, S. (2009). Pricing final indemnification payments to private sponsors in project-financed public-private partnerships: An application of real options valuation. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 21(3), 95-106. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6622.2009.00243.x
Carbonara, N., & Pellegrino, R. (2018). Revenue guarantee in public–private partnerships: a win–win model. Construction Management and Economics, 1-15. https:// doi.org/10.1080/01446193.2018.1467028
Cabero, F., Sánchez, A., & Lara, A. (2017). Default and abandonment option in mo¬torway concessions. Journal of Infrastructure Systems, 23(1), 04016022. https:// doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)is.1943-555X.0000309
Buso, M., Dosi, C., & Moretto, M. (2019). Termination fees and contract design in public-private partnerships. Working paper No. 032.2018. https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/191374/1/ndl2018-032.pdf
Brennan, M., & Schwartz, E. (1985). Evaluating natural resource investments. The Journal of Business, 58(2), 135-157.
Brandão, L., & Saraiva, E. (2008). The option value of government guarantees in infrastructure projects. Construction Management and Economics, 26(11), 1171- 1180. https://doi.org/10.1080/01446190802428051
Bowe, M., & Lee, D. (2004). Project evaluation in the presence of multiple embedded real options: evidence from the Taiwan High-Speed Rail Project. Journal of Asian Economics, 15(1), 71-98. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.asieco.2003.12.001
Black, F., & Scholes, M. (1973). The pricing of options and corporate liabilities. Journal of Political Economy, 81(3), 637-659. https://doi.org/10.1142/97898147595 88_0001
Attarzadeh, M., Chua, D., Beer, M., & Abbott, E. (2017). Options-based negotiation management of PPP–BOT infrastructure projects. Construction Management and Economics, 35(11-12), 676-692. https://doi.org/10.1080/01446193.2017.1325962
Ashuri, B., Asce, M., Kashani, H., Molenaar, K., Asce, M., Lee, S. & Lu, J. (2012). Risk-neutral pricing approach for evaluating bot highway projects with government minimum revenue guarantee options. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 138(4), 545-557. https://doi.org/10.1061/(asce) co.1943-7862.0000447
Ameyaw, E. & Chan, A. (2015). Evaluation and ranking of risk factors in public–private partnership water supply projects in developing countries using fuzzy synthetic evaluation approach. Expert Systems with Applications, 42(12), 5102-5116. https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.eswa.2015.02.041
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publishDate 2024-03-21
date_accessioned 2024-03-21T11:15:55Z
date_available 2024-03-21T11:15:55Z
url https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/odeon/article/view/9339
url_doi https://doi.org/10.18601/17941113.n25.06
issn 1794-1113
eissn 2346-2140
doi 10.18601/17941113.n25.06
citationstartpage 117
citationendpage 141
url2_str_mv https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/odeon/article/download/9339/15632
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