La concepción sustantiva del estado de derecho: problemáticas y desafíos
Los partidarios de la noción sustantiva de Estado de derecho señalan que el mismo es compatible y se construye a partir de las exigencias propias del denominado Estado formal de derecho. Este último exige que el derecho cumpla con ciertas exigencias que aseguren que el contenido del mismo sea capaz de: (i) limitar de forma significativa la autoridad estatal y (ii) orientar los procesos de toma de decisión de los ciudadanos. Sin embargo elementos propios de la noción de Estado de derecho sustantivo, como el reconocimiento de declaraciones de derechos judicialmente aplicables de forma directa, generan fuertes tensiones con las exigencias de la galidad. Esto especialmente en al área de la discrecionalidad judicial. Frente a esto, el autor conc... Ver más
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Jurídicas - 2016
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La concepción sustantiva del estado de derecho: problemáticas y desafíos Goldsworhty, J. (2001). Legislative sovereignty and the rule of law. En Campbell, T., Ewing, K. and Tomkins, A. (Ed.). Sceptical essays on human rights. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Raz, J. (2012). The rule of law and its virtue. The authority of law. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Moens, G. (1994). The wrongs of a constitutional entrenched bill of rights. En Stephenson, M.A and Turner, C. (Ed.). Australia: Republic or monarchy? Legal and constitutional issues. Brisbane, Australia: University of Queensland. Jowell, J. (2015). The rule of law: A practical and universal concept. En Jowell, J., Thomas, C. and van Zyl Smit, J. (Ed.). Rule of law symposium 2014. The importance of the rule of law in promoting development. Singapore, Singapore: Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law y Singapore Academy of Law. Joseph, P.A. (2011). The rule of law: foundational norm. En: Ekins, R. (Ed.). Modern challenges to the rule of law. Wellington, New Zealand: Lexis Nexis. Jestaedt, M. (2012). The doctrine of balancing–Its strengths and weaknesses. En Klatt, M. (Ed.). Institutionalized reason: The jurisprudence of Robert Alexy. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Heydon, J.D. (2014). Are bills of rights necessary in common law systems? Law Quarterly Review, 130, 2-53. George, R. (2001). Reason, freedom, and the rule of law: Their significance in the natural law tradition. American Journal of Jurisprudence, 46, 249-314. Summers, R.S. (1998). The principles of the rule of law. Notre Dame Law Review, 74, 1691-1792. Finnis, J. (2011). Natural law and natural rights. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Dworkin, R. (1985). Political judges and the rule of law. A matter of principle. Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA: Harvard University Press. Dicey, A.V. (1982). Introduction to the study of the law and the constitution. Indiana, USA: Liberty Fund. Charlow, R. (2014). American constitutional analysis and a substantive understanding of the rule of law. En Silkenat, J.R., Hickey, J.E. and Barenboim, P.D. (Ed.). The legal doctrines of the rule of law and the legal state (Rechtsstaat). Heidelberg, Germany: Springer. Craig, P. (1997). Formal and substantive conceptions of the rule of law: An analytical framework. Public Law, 467, 1-15. Bingham, T. (2011). The rule of law. London, England: Penguin Books. Shklar, J.N. (1987). Political theory and the rule of law. En Hutchenson, A.C. and Monahan, P. (Ed.). The rule of law: Ideal or ideology? Toronto, Canada: Carswell. Sunstein, C.R. (1996). Legal reasoning and political conflict. Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA: Harvard University Press. Allan, J. (2011). Reasonable Disagreement and the Diminution of Democracy: Joseph’s Morally Laden Understanding of the rule of law. En Ekins, R. (Ed.). Modern challenges to the rule of law. Wellington, New Zealand: Lexis Nexis. http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 Text http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion http://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/ARTREF info:eu-repo/semantics/article Tamanaha, B. (2004). On the rule of law. History, politics, theory. Cambridge, USA: Cambridge University Press. Zimmermann, A. (2007). The rule of law as a culture of legality: Legal and extra-legal elements for the realization of the rule of law in society. Murdoch University Law Review, 14, 10-31. Yowell, P. (2012). Legislación, Common law y la virtud de la claridad. Revista Chilena de Derecho, 39 (2), 481-512. Webber, G. (2013). Rights and the rule of law in the balance. Law Quarterly Review, 129, 399-419. Webber, G. (2009). The negotiable constitution. On the limits of rights. Cambridge, USA: Cambridge University Press. Waldron, J. (2011). The rule of law and the importance of procedure. En Fleming, J.E. (Ed.). Getting to the rule of law. New York: New York University Press. Waldron, J. (1999). Law and disagreement. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Urbina, F.J. (2012). A critique of proportionality. American Journal of Jurisprudence, 57 (1), 49-80. Beatty, D.M. (2007). The ultimate rule of law. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Allan, J. (2000). Oh that I were made judge in the land. Federal Law Review, 30 (3), 561-576. Allan, T.R.S. (2013). The Sovereignty of Law. Freedom, Constitution and Common Law. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. application/pdf Los partidarios de la noción sustantiva de Estado de derecho señalan que el mismo es compatible y se construye a partir de las exigencias propias del denominado Estado formal de derecho. Este último exige que el derecho cumpla con ciertas exigencias que aseguren que el contenido del mismo sea capaz de: (i) limitar de forma significativa la autoridad estatal y (ii) orientar los procesos de toma de decisión de los ciudadanos. Sin embargo elementos propios de la noción de Estado de derecho sustantivo, como el reconocimiento de declaraciones de derechos judicialmente aplicables de forma directa, generan fuertes tensiones con las exigencias de la galidad. Esto especialmente en al área de la discrecionalidad judicial. Frente a esto, el autor concluye que los partidarios de la noción de Estado de derecho sustantivo deben: (i) repensar el concepto buscando aliviar dichas tensiones o (ii) simplemente construir la noción sobre bases conceptuales diversas. Candia-Falcón, Gonzalo Estado de derecho predictibilidad del derecho declaraciones de derechos discrecionalidad judicial revisión judicial 13 2 Núm. 2 , Año 2016 : Julio - Diciembre Artículo de revista Publication Universidad de Caldas Jurídicas Allan, T.R.S. (2001). Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of The Rule of Law. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Jurídicas - 2016 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ Español https://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/juridicas/article/view/3328 Supporters of the substantive rule of law state that the concept is compatible with the demands of the formal notion of the rule of law. Indeed, they affirm that those demands represent the basis upon which the substantive concept is built. Basically, those formalities demand that the law must be able to: (a) effectively limit the discretion of public authorities and (b) guide the decision-making processes of citizens. However, elements of the substantive notion of the rule of law, such as the existence of bills of rights directly enforceable by courts, create tensions with the imperatives of legality. This is particularly true concerning judicial discretion. In this context, the author concludes that those who support the substantive notion of the rule of law must either: (a) rethink the concept seeking mechanisms to alleviate the identified tensions within the concept, or (b) build the notion upon different grounds. rule of law predictability of the law bill of rights judicial discretion judicial review The substantive conception of the Rule of Law: problems and challenges Journal article 10.17151/jurid.2016.13.2.2 2590-8928 https://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/juridicas/article/download/3328/3090 https://doi.org/10.17151/jurid.2016.13.2.2 1794-2918 2016-07-01T00:00:00Z 9 26 2016-07-01T00:00:00Z 2016-07-01 |
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Jurídicas |
| title |
La concepción sustantiva del estado de derecho: problemáticas y desafíos |
| spellingShingle |
La concepción sustantiva del estado de derecho: problemáticas y desafíos Candia-Falcón, Gonzalo Estado de derecho predictibilidad del derecho declaraciones de derechos discrecionalidad judicial revisión judicial rule of law predictability of the law bill of rights judicial discretion judicial review |
| title_short |
La concepción sustantiva del estado de derecho: problemáticas y desafíos |
| title_full |
La concepción sustantiva del estado de derecho: problemáticas y desafíos |
| title_fullStr |
La concepción sustantiva del estado de derecho: problemáticas y desafíos |
| title_full_unstemmed |
La concepción sustantiva del estado de derecho: problemáticas y desafíos |
| title_sort |
la concepción sustantiva del estado de derecho: problemáticas y desafíos |
| title_eng |
The substantive conception of the Rule of Law: problems and challenges |
| description |
Los partidarios de la noción sustantiva de Estado de derecho señalan que el mismo es compatible y se construye a partir de las exigencias propias del denominado Estado formal de derecho. Este último exige que el derecho cumpla con ciertas exigencias que aseguren que el contenido del mismo sea capaz de: (i) limitar de forma significativa la autoridad estatal y (ii) orientar los procesos de toma de decisión de los ciudadanos. Sin embargo elementos propios de la noción de Estado de derecho sustantivo, como el reconocimiento de declaraciones de derechos judicialmente aplicables de forma directa, generan fuertes tensiones con las exigencias de la galidad. Esto especialmente en al área de la discrecionalidad judicial. Frente a esto, el autor concluye que los partidarios de la noción de Estado de derecho sustantivo deben: (i) repensar el concepto buscando aliviar dichas tensiones o (ii) simplemente construir la noción sobre bases conceptuales diversas.
|
| description_eng |
Supporters of the substantive rule of law state that the concept is compatible with the demands of the formal notion of the rule of law. Indeed, they affirm that those demands represent the basis upon which the substantive concept is built. Basically, those formalities demand that the law must be able to: (a) effectively limit the discretion of public authorities and (b) guide the decision-making processes of citizens. However, elements of the substantive notion of the rule of law, such as the existence of bills of rights directly enforceable by courts, create tensions with the imperatives of legality. This is particularly true concerning judicial discretion. In this context, the author concludes that those who support the substantive notion of the rule of law must either: (a) rethink the concept seeking mechanisms to alleviate the identified tensions within the concept, or (b) build the notion upon different grounds.
|
| author |
Candia-Falcón, Gonzalo |
| author_facet |
Candia-Falcón, Gonzalo |
| topicspa_str_mv |
Estado de derecho predictibilidad del derecho declaraciones de derechos discrecionalidad judicial revisión judicial |
| topic |
Estado de derecho predictibilidad del derecho declaraciones de derechos discrecionalidad judicial revisión judicial rule of law predictability of the law bill of rights judicial discretion judicial review |
| topic_facet |
Estado de derecho predictibilidad del derecho declaraciones de derechos discrecionalidad judicial revisión judicial rule of law predictability of the law bill of rights judicial discretion judicial review |
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13 |
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2 |
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Núm. 2 , Año 2016 : Julio - Diciembre |
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Universidad de Caldas |
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Jurídicas |
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https://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/juridicas/article/view/3328 |
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Español |
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Article |
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http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess Jurídicas - 2016 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ |
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Goldsworhty, J. (2001). Legislative sovereignty and the rule of law. En Campbell, T., Ewing, K. and Tomkins, A. (Ed.). Sceptical essays on human rights. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Raz, J. (2012). The rule of law and its virtue. The authority of law. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Moens, G. (1994). The wrongs of a constitutional entrenched bill of rights. En Stephenson, M.A and Turner, C. (Ed.). Australia: Republic or monarchy? Legal and constitutional issues. Brisbane, Australia: University of Queensland. Jowell, J. (2015). The rule of law: A practical and universal concept. En Jowell, J., Thomas, C. and van Zyl Smit, J. (Ed.). Rule of law symposium 2014. The importance of the rule of law in promoting development. Singapore, Singapore: Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law y Singapore Academy of Law. Joseph, P.A. (2011). The rule of law: foundational norm. En: Ekins, R. (Ed.). Modern challenges to the rule of law. Wellington, New Zealand: Lexis Nexis. Jestaedt, M. (2012). The doctrine of balancing–Its strengths and weaknesses. En Klatt, M. (Ed.). Institutionalized reason: The jurisprudence of Robert Alexy. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Heydon, J.D. (2014). Are bills of rights necessary in common law systems? Law Quarterly Review, 130, 2-53. George, R. (2001). Reason, freedom, and the rule of law: Their significance in the natural law tradition. American Journal of Jurisprudence, 46, 249-314. Summers, R.S. (1998). The principles of the rule of law. Notre Dame Law Review, 74, 1691-1792. Finnis, J. (2011). Natural law and natural rights. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Dworkin, R. (1985). Political judges and the rule of law. A matter of principle. Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA: Harvard University Press. Dicey, A.V. (1982). Introduction to the study of the law and the constitution. Indiana, USA: Liberty Fund. Charlow, R. (2014). American constitutional analysis and a substantive understanding of the rule of law. En Silkenat, J.R., Hickey, J.E. and Barenboim, P.D. (Ed.). The legal doctrines of the rule of law and the legal state (Rechtsstaat). Heidelberg, Germany: Springer. Craig, P. (1997). Formal and substantive conceptions of the rule of law: An analytical framework. Public Law, 467, 1-15. Bingham, T. (2011). The rule of law. London, England: Penguin Books. Shklar, J.N. (1987). Political theory and the rule of law. En Hutchenson, A.C. and Monahan, P. (Ed.). The rule of law: Ideal or ideology? Toronto, Canada: Carswell. Sunstein, C.R. (1996). Legal reasoning and political conflict. Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA: Harvard University Press. Allan, J. (2011). Reasonable Disagreement and the Diminution of Democracy: Joseph’s Morally Laden Understanding of the rule of law. En Ekins, R. (Ed.). Modern challenges to the rule of law. Wellington, New Zealand: Lexis Nexis. Tamanaha, B. (2004). On the rule of law. History, politics, theory. Cambridge, USA: Cambridge University Press. Zimmermann, A. (2007). The rule of law as a culture of legality: Legal and extra-legal elements for the realization of the rule of law in society. Murdoch University Law Review, 14, 10-31. Yowell, P. (2012). Legislación, Common law y la virtud de la claridad. Revista Chilena de Derecho, 39 (2), 481-512. Webber, G. (2013). Rights and the rule of law in the balance. Law Quarterly Review, 129, 399-419. Webber, G. (2009). The negotiable constitution. On the limits of rights. Cambridge, USA: Cambridge University Press. Waldron, J. (2011). The rule of law and the importance of procedure. En Fleming, J.E. (Ed.). Getting to the rule of law. New York: New York University Press. Waldron, J. (1999). Law and disagreement. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Urbina, F.J. (2012). A critique of proportionality. American Journal of Jurisprudence, 57 (1), 49-80. Beatty, D.M. (2007). The ultimate rule of law. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Allan, J. (2000). Oh that I were made judge in the land. Federal Law Review, 30 (3), 561-576. Allan, T.R.S. (2013). The Sovereignty of Law. Freedom, Constitution and Common Law. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Allan, T.R.S. (2001). Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of The Rule of Law. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. |
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