O caráter dualista da filosofia da mente de John Searle
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2462-9596
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2014-07-01
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Discusiones Filosóficas - 2014
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O caráter dualista da filosofia da mente de John Searle 15 Discusiones Filosóficas Universidad de Caldas Núm. 25 , Año 2014 : Julio - Diciembre 25 Artículo de revista - De Athayde Prata, Tárik - biological naturalism Dualismo de propriedades naturalismo biológico problema mente-corpo Property dualism Journal article mind-body problem The dualistic character of John Searle’s philosophy of mind This paper holds that Searle's biological naturalism is a variant of property dualism. After an exam of the mind-body problem and of property dualism (section 2), and after an exposition of biological naturalism (section 3), I engage in a critical discussion of Searle's view about ontological subjectivity (section 4), a view that leads biological naturalism to a dualism between objective and subjective properties (section 5). Searle, J. R. “Minds, Brains and Programs”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 1980: 417-424. Print. ---. “Consciousness, the Brain and the Connection Principle: a Reply”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Mar. 1995: 217-232. Print. ---. The Rediscovery of the Mind. Cambridge Mass., London: MIT Press, 1992. A redescoberta da mente. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1997. Impresso. ---. Intentionality: an Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Intencionalidade. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1995. Impresso. Prata, T. A. “Irredutibilidade ontológica versus identidade: John Searle entre o dualismo e o materialismo”. O que nos faz Pensar. 2009: 107-124. Impresso. ---. “É o naturalismo biológico uma concepção fisicalista?” Principia. 2012: 255-276. Impresso. ---. “É incoerente a concepção de Searle sobre a consciência?” Manuscrito. 2011: 557-578. Impresso. ---. “Características e dificuldades do Naturalismo Biológico de John Searle”. Philósophos. 2009: 141-173. Impresso. Nida-Rümelin, M. “Causal reduction, ontological reduction and firstperson ontology. Notes on Searle’s views about conciousness”. G. Grewendorf and G. Meggle (orgs.). Speech acts, mind and social reality: Discussions with John R. Searle. Dordrecht, Boston, Londres: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002. Print. Nagel, T. “What is it like to be a bat”. Philosophical Review. 1974: 435-450.Print. ---. Consciousness and Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Consciência e linguagem. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2010. Impresso. ---. Mind, Language, and Society: Doing Philosophy in the Real World. London: Weinfeld & Nicolson, 1999. Mente, linguagem e sociedade: filosofia no mundo real. Rio de Janeiro: Rocco, 2000. Impresso. info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion ---. “Why I Am Not a Property Dualist”. Journal of Consciousness Studies. 2002: 57-64. Print. ---. Mind: A Brief Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.Print. ---. “Dualism Revisited”. Journal of Physiology. 2007: 169-178. Print. Stoecker, R. and J. Searle. “Interview with John Searle”. G. Grewendorf and G. Meggle (orgs.). Speech acts, mind and social reality: Discussions with John R. Searle. Dordrecht, Boston, Londres: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002. Print. Tsohatzidis, L. (ed.). Intentional Acts and Institutional Facts: Essays on John Searle’s Social Ontology. Dordrecht: Springer, 2007. Print. https://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/download/770/693 info:eu-repo/semantics/article http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 Lange, M. “Laws of nature”. S. Psillos and M. Curd (eds.). The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science. London: Routledge, 2008. Print. http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 Text Maslin, K. T. Filosofia da mente. Porto Alegre: Artmed, 2009. Impresso. ---. Matéria e consciência: uma introdução contemporânea à filosofia da mente. São Paulo: Editora da Unesp, 2004. Impresso. Kripke, S. Naming and necessity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001. Print. 43 2014-07-01T00:00:00Z 2014-07-01T00:00:00Z 2014-07-01 application/pdf 0124-6127 2462-9596 https://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/view/770 https://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/view/770 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ Discusiones Filosóficas - 2014 62 ---. Physicalism, or something near enough. Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005. Print. Blackburn, S. “Metafísica”. N. Bunnin and E.P. Tsui-James (eds.). Compêndio de filosofia. São Paulo: Loyola, 2002. Impresso. Corcoran, K. “The Trouble with Searle’s Biological Naturalism”. Erkenntnis. 2001: 307-324. Print. Chalmers, D. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. Print. ---. “Consciousness and its Place in Nature”. W. Stich and F. Warfield (orgs.). The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. Malden, Oxford, Melbourne, Berlin: Blackwell Publishing, 2003. Print. Churchland, P. “Betty Crocker’s Theory” [Resenha de The Rediscovery of The Mind]. London Review of Books. May. 1994: 13-14. Print. Crane, T. “Review on The Rediscovery of The Mind”. International Journal of Philosophical Studies. Sep. 1993: 313-324. Print. Cunningham, S. What is a Mind? An Integrative Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Indianápolis: Hackett Publishing, 2000. Print. Grayling, A. C. “Epistemologia”. N. Bunnin and E.P. Tsui-James (eds.). Compêndio de filosofia. São Paulo: Loyola, 2002. Impresso. Harré, R. “Laws of nature”. W. H. Newton-Smith (ed.). A Companion to the Philosophy of Science. Oxford: Blackwell, 2001. Print. Hodgson, D. “Why Searle has not rediscovered the mind”. Journal of Consciousness Studies. 1994: 264-274. Print. Jackson, F. “Epiphenomenal qualia”. Philosophical Quarterly. 1982: 127-136. Print. Kim, J. Supervenience and Mind: Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Print. Publication |
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UNIVERSIDAD DE CALDAS |
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Discusiones Filosóficas |
| title |
O caráter dualista da filosofia da mente de John Searle |
| spellingShingle |
O caráter dualista da filosofia da mente de John Searle De Athayde Prata, Tárik biological naturalism Dualismo de propriedades naturalismo biológico problema mente-corpo Property dualism mind-body problem |
| title_short |
O caráter dualista da filosofia da mente de John Searle |
| title_full |
O caráter dualista da filosofia da mente de John Searle |
| title_fullStr |
O caráter dualista da filosofia da mente de John Searle |
| title_full_unstemmed |
O caráter dualista da filosofia da mente de John Searle |
| title_sort |
o caráter dualista da filosofia da mente de john searle |
| title_eng |
The dualistic character of John Searle’s philosophy of mind |
| description |
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| description_eng |
This paper holds that Searle's biological naturalism is a variant of property dualism. After an exam of the mind-body problem and of property dualism (section 2), and after an exposition of biological naturalism (section 3), I engage in a critical discussion of Searle's view about ontological subjectivity (section 4), a view that leads biological naturalism to a dualism between objective and subjective properties (section 5).
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| author |
De Athayde Prata, Tárik |
| author_facet |
De Athayde Prata, Tárik |
| topic |
biological naturalism Dualismo de propriedades naturalismo biológico problema mente-corpo Property dualism mind-body problem |
| topic_facet |
biological naturalism Dualismo de propriedades naturalismo biológico problema mente-corpo Property dualism mind-body problem |
| citationvolume |
15 |
| citationissue |
25 |
| citationedition |
Núm. 25 , Año 2014 : Julio - Diciembre |
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Universidad de Caldas |
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Discusiones Filosóficas |
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https://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/view/770 |
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|
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Article |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ Discusiones Filosóficas - 2014 |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
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http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
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http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 |
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Text |
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2014-07-01 |
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2014-07-01T00:00:00Z |
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2014-07-01T00:00:00Z |
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https://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/view/770 |
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https://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/view/770 |
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0124-6127 |
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2462-9596 |
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43 |
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62 |
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https://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/download/770/693 |
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